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Abstract

Cognitive models of anxiety posit that socially anxious individuals' attention is
disproportionally biased for threatening information in the environment. One component
in the cognitive model of social anxiety that has not been examined, in terms of the

attentional bias, is rumination (i.e., the dwelling on perceived inadequacies). The purpose
of the present research was to examine the impact that rumination had on attentional
biases in social anxiety as measured through the use of a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation
(RSVP) stream. When two target stimuli (Tl and T2) are presented amongst distractor
stimuli in rapid succession it is hard to process T2 within 500 ms of the presentation of
Tl; this is known as the attentional blink (AB). Given that previous research has
extensively documented that the AB is attenuated when T2 is of relevance to the
individual, it was hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety would have an
attenuated AB when T2 was a social threat word, compared to a neutral word, and
compared to participants low in social anxiety. The first study did not find support for
this hypothesis - no attenuated AB was found for participants high in social anxiety (n =
15) for social threat words compared to those low in social anxiety (n = 20). Study 2
expanded upon Study 1 by examining the impact of rumination on the AB between
participants high (n = 32) or low (n = 34) in social anxiety. It was hypothesized that
participants high in social anxiety and in the rumination condition would have an
attenuated AB for social threat words, compared to participants in the distraction
condition, and participants low in social anxiety in either manipulation condition. No
differences were found for accuracy identification rates between social anxiety groups
and manipulation conditions. Limitations and implications of the results are discussed.
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Attentional Biases in Social Anxiety: An Investigation of Rumination
Social Anxiety
Social anxiety, also known as social phobia, is characterized by the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2000) as an irrational, intense fear of negative evaluation from others
during social or performance situations. Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is the third most
common psychiatric disorder, surpassed only by depression and substance abuse (Kessler
et al., 1994), and has a lifetime prevalence estimated at 13-14% (Wittchen & Fehm,
2003). Epidemiologic studies have suggested that individuals with SAD suffer significant
impairments across a multitude of domains (Kessler et al., 1994; Lipsitz & Schneider,
2000; Mendlowicz & Stein, 2000), with data showing individuals with SAD having
received less education (Davidson et al., 1993), and higher unemployment rates
(Wittchen & Beloch, 1996) when compared to individuals without SAD. Furthermore,
individuals with SAD are more likely to have impaired functioning in social and romantic
relationships; one study reported that only 34% of individuals with SAD were married,
compared with 57% of individuals without SAD in the control group (Wittchen &
Beloch, 1996). Thus, social anxiety is a debilitating and prevalent condition that can have

a negative impact on an individual's emotional and social well-being. SAD is a complex
condition, where a multitude of factors contribute to its etiology, perpetuation, and
exacerbation. Cognitive models provide a framework for the maintenance and

exacerbation of pathological levels of social anxiety.
Cognitive models of social anxiety suggest the existence of an attentional
processing bias to information related to social threat. It is thought that the preferential
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processing of social threat related stimuli serves to exacerbate and maintain the disorder.
However, there appears to be a discrepancy in the literature as to the nature of the bias.
Although some literature has found support for social phobies to have a hypervigilance
towards social threat stimuli, other research has found evidence for avoidance of social
threat stimuli. Adding to the confusion, the paradigms that have traditionally been used to
investigate cognitive biases in social anxiety have fallen under criticism. Thus, the use of
a different paradigm, such as the attentional blink, may help to elucidate previous
discrepancies. The attentional blink is a cognitive paradigm that charts attentional
processes across a small epoch of time. Stimuli are presented in a rapid sequential
manner, with participants having to identify two targets. When two targets are placed
within 500 ms of each other, the accuracy for identifying the second target decreases,
which is known as the attentional blink period; the attentional blink, as well as other

commonly used paradigms for examining attentional biases in social anxiety, will be
described later in more detail.

Post-event processing, also known as rumination, is a component of social anxiety
that is conceptualized in cognitive models as having a role in the maintenance and

exacerbation of social anxiety. Rumination is defined as the constant dwelling on
perceived negative attributes/failures; a person with social anxiety would typically
ruminate about how they performed in a social interaction/performance situation. Despite
the negative impact that rumination has on individuals with social anxiety, research
examining how rumination affects cognitive biases has been sparse.
Thus, the purpose of this document is to explore the impact rumination has on the
attentional bias in individuals with high and low levels of social anxiety, through the use
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of a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) paradigm to assess the attentional blink.
First, this document will review the different cognitive biases in social anxiety that have
traditionally been examined by cognitive paradigms, such as the emotional Stroop task,
and the dot probe task. Second, research on the attentional blink will be reviewed, with an
examination of different theories of the attentional blink, and factors that influence the

magnitude. Third, two experiments that were conducted will be discussed; the two
experiments sought to address the following questions:

(I)

How do high socially anxious participants respond to social threat words
in an attentional blink paradigm compared to participants low in social
anxiety?

(II)

Can engaging in rumination affect the attentional bias to social threat
words in high socially anxious individuals on an attentional blink task

compared to participants high in social anxiety in a distraction condition,
and compared to low socially anxious participants in either the rumination
or distraction conditions?

Last, this document will endeavor to explain the results of the studies in relation to the

implications for the literature on social anxiety and cognitive biases, as well as address
potential future directions and limitations.
Cognitive Models of Social Anxiety

Cognitive models of social anxiety are well researched and provide a framework
for the development and perpetuation of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). These cognitive models are comprised of
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several components: beliefs about the self, anticipatory and post event processing, selffocused attention, and safety behaviours.
Rapee and Heimberg's (1997) cognitive model of social anxiety. A diagram of
Rapee and Heimberg's (1997) model of social anxiety is presented as Figure 1. Rapee

and Heimberg's cognitive model of social anxiety proposes a series of sequential
processes that occur when an individual enters into an anxious state. Rapee and Heimberg
note that the processes described in their model occur in a similar manner whether
anxiety arises prior to (anticipatory processing), during, or after (post-event processing) a
social/evaluative encounter. Rapee and Heimberg (1997) posit that individuals high in
social anxiety hold the maladaptive belief that everyone is inherently critical. In support
of this notion, previous research has found that people high in social anxiety fear they
will be evaluated negatively because of the inherent critical nature of others, coupled with

a fear of their own shortcomings in a social/evaluative situation (Leary, Kowalski, &
Campbell, 1988). Despite fears of being evaluated negatively by their audience, Rapee

and Heimberg believe that socially anxious individuals attach huge importance to, and
crave positive appraisal from others.

Upon entering a social situation, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) believe that socially
anxious individuals form a mental representation of their external appearance and

behaviours based upon how they believe the audience will perceive them. This mental
representation of the self is formed from an amalgamation of inputs coming from sources
such as long term memory (e.g., previous experience in similar situations, general
appearance, etc), internal cues (e.g., proprioception, and physical symptoms such as
sweating), and external cues (e.g., audience feedback). However, Rapee and Heimberg

Figure 1.

Rapee and Heimberg's (1997) Cognitive Model of Social Phobia
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note that this mental representation that socially anxious individuals form of themselves
is a distorted image based upon how they perceive an audience views them, and does not
represent an internal photograph. In fact, the mental image is conceptualized to be fluid in
nature, and thus can change depending upon what the individual is most anxious to
receive negative evaluation on. Thus, Rapee and Heimberg suggest that attentional
resources are directed towards more salient information, and the saliency subsequently
causes high socially anxious individuals to exaggerate those features in their mental
representation of themselves. Therefore, the attentional resources of the socially anxious

individual are partially directed inwards, and are focused on monitoring for the
assessment of mistakes made during the social/evaluative situation.
Not only are attentional resources directed inward on the construction of this

mental representation, but attentional focus is also allocated for external signs of threat in
the environment. Rapee and Heimberg (1997) define an external threat as any indicator of
possible negative evaluation, such as frowns, yawning, and general signs of boredom.
Rapee and Heimberg believe that during the social-evaluative situation socially anxious
individuals compare how they believe the audience perceives them (the mental image the
socially anxious individual constructs) and the standard at which the audience is

evaluating their performance, appearance, and behaviour. Rapee and Heimberg theorize
that the larger the discrepancy between the mental representation and the perceived

standard of audience evaluation, the higher the anxiety stemming from the belief that they
are failing to meet standards, and thus being negatively evaluated. The fear ofjudgment
subsequently leads to behavioural, cognitive, and physical symptoms of anxiety. In turn,
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these symptoms of anxiety cause the socially anxious individual to alter the mental
representation of the self s/he believes is seen by the audience.
Clark and Wells' (1995) cognitive model of social anxiety. A diagram of Clark
and Wells' (1995) cognitive model of social anxiety is presented as Figure 2. Clark and
Wells' cognitive model is similar to Rapee and Heimberg' s (1997) model, in that social
anxiety is theorized to be perpetuated by maladaptive beliefs about the self, as well as
having attentional biases towards threatening external stimuli, coupled with an internal
self-focused attention. Clark and Wells believe that when socially anxious individuals
enter a social situation two things happen: first, these individuals believe that they are

inept and that they will behave/perform inadequately or unfavourably. Second, these
individuals believe that this inept behaviour will cause them to be negatively evaluated
by the audience.
Clark and Wells (1995) outline four main processes that perpetuate negative
beliefs about socially anxious individuals that serve to maintain anxiety. Three of these

processes occur during a socially threatening situation; the fourth process involves what
the socially anxious individual does prior to (anticipatory processing), and after (postevent processing) the threatening situation.

Clark and Wells (1995) posit that when individuals high in social anxiety enter a
feared/ anxiety provoking situation their attentional focus is shifted inwards. The focus is
on monitoring and observing themselves so that they will be aware of any perceived
flaws in their performance that the audience may critique. Previous research also supports
this notion, as it has been found that individuals high in social anxiety become more self

focused in social situations (Perowne & Mansell, 2002; Stopa & Clark, 2003), with the
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Figure 2.
Clark and Wells' (1995) Cognitive Model of Social Phobia.
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processing of emotional and physical information taking precedent over external cues and
events. The inward focus of attention serves to maintain socially anxious behaviour
because it forces individuals to engage in post-event processing by reviewing their
perceived inadequacies. The reviewing of perceived flaws further creates anxiety because
a socially anxious individual longs to come across in an unrealistically flawless light
(Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Clark and Wells believe that this inward attentional shift is
problematic because it enhances the awareness of feared anxiety response and interferes
with processing the situation and other's behaviour accurately. Furthermore, the authors
believe that this inward focus of attention is problematic because individuals high in

social anxiety make the assumption that what they feel reflects what other people notice
and think about them. For example, a socially anxious person would equate feeling
humiliated with actually being humiliated. This processing style is maladaptive and Clark
and Wells offer two potential explanations why social phobies continue to utilize this
style.
First, Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that social phobies are so concerned with
how others perceive them, that they are strongly motivated to look for how others
perceive them. This motivation also stems from the fact that social phobies are greatly
threatened by the potential negative evaluation from others. Second, Clark and Wells

suggest that the way in which non social phobies gather information regarding others'
perceptions/evaluations of them is too threatening for social phobies to utilize because of
the potential for negative evaluation. For example, non social phobies will utilize a
myriad of ways to gather information about how others view them, such as using
increased eye contact, explicitly asking for reactions to what was said, and disclosing
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more personal information. Although the use of increased eye contact would help social

phobies to be able to gauge the level of interest the other person has in what they are
saying/doing, prolonged eye contact is difficult for social phobies because it makes them
feel vulnerable, and thus is typically avoided.
Clark and Wells (1995) also maintain that in order to reduce their anxiety, social
phobies will engage in self-protective behaviours. Self protective behaviours serve as

safety mechanisms for socially anxious individuals, and consist of lack of eye contact,
withdrawal, and avoidance of future social anxiety provoking situation/interactions.
Although these self protective behaviours may help to reduce anxiety in a situation, they
are associated with high levels of anxiety and provide merely a band-aid solution to
anxiety reduction. Furthermore, Clark and Wells suggest that by using these safety
behaviours in an anxiety provoking situation, social phobies do not have the opportunity
for disconfirming their unrealistic beliefs about the consequences of these behaviours. In
fact, the authors also suggest that in certain situations, the safety behaviour can make the
feared behaviour more likely to occur. Supporting this notion, previous research suggests
that exposure to situations while refraining from engaging in safety behaviours is
associated with a decrease in anxiety (Scholing & Emmelkamp, 1993).
Clark and Wells (1995) also suggest that social phobies find situations to be
threatening as a result of the dysfunctional assumptions they hold about themselves.

Clark and Wells break down the different assumptions in to three categories: excessively
high standards, conditional beliefs, and unconditional beliefs. Social phobies have
excessively high standards for social performance, which creates anxiety because they are
concerned that they will fail to convey their desired impression to their audience, and as a
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result be negatively evaluated. Social phobies also have conditional beliefs about
themselves, where they are concerned with how negatively others will view them; they
believe that they will be viewed/evaluated negatively because they are worthless, stupid,
unattractive, etc. Last, Clark and Wells argue that social phobies hold unconditional
beliefs about the self, where these negative beliefs are centered on their value and worth.

Clark and Wells argue that social phobies have unstable self-schemata, so when in a
social/threatening situation, they view themselves negatively, but when alone or in a nonthreatening situation, they have a more positive view of themselves.
Clark and Wells (1995) also highlight the importance of anticipatory and post
event processing in the maintenance of social anxiety. Anticipatory processing consists of
thoughts and feelings that are experienced prior to a social event. Hinrichsen and Clark
(2003) found that during the anticipatory processing stage, socially anxious individuals
were more likely than controls to recall past failures and the potential for negative
consequence in an impending social interaction. Although some research postulates that
this could potentially serve as a negative self fulfilling prophecy (Vassilopoulos, 2004),
other research suggests that anticipatory processing may also have beneficial aspects.
Brown and Stropa (2006) examined whether anticipatory processing would have a
negative effect in socially anxious and non-socially anxious individuals. Participants
were divided into a non-anticipatory processing condition or a 10 minute anticipatory
processing condition prior to giving a speech. Although results indicated that socially
anxious individuals in the anticipatory processing condition were found to have greater
anxiety, both socially anxious and non-socially anxious individuals gave better speech
performance ratings for themselves on their speeches following the anticipatory
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processing period. One potential reason for this finding could be that during the
anticipatory period participants were able to organize their thoughts regarding the
impending speech, and to mentally prepare themselves for the stressful situation. It is
possible that this preparation time helped participants to feel more confident in the
quality of their speech. Brown and Stropa did not have judges rate the speeches, so
although participants in the anticipatory processing condition gave themselves better
speech performance ratings, the actual quality of their speech performance may not have
improved. Although the Brown and Stropa study provides some evidence as to the
potential beneficial nature of anticipatory processing, such positive gains may be
qualified. For instance, Vassilopoulos (2004) found that individuals were most likely to
avoid a situation if they had engaged in anticipatory processing. Thus, anticipatory
processing may have some benefits (whether actual or perceived), but these gains may be
useless if the anxiety is so severe that it causes the social phobic to avoid the situation
altogether.

Another maladaptive cognitive process for socially anxious individuals is the
tendency to review their performance in social situations. This review process has been
given many different labels in the literature: 'post event processing' (Clark & Wells,
1995; Rachman, Gruter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000), 'post-mortem' (Clark & Wells,

1995), 'retrospective brooding' (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), and 'post-event rumination'
(Abbott & Rapee, 2004). Throughout the social anxiety literature these terms are used
interchangeably. However, for the purpose of consistency, hereafter this process will be
referred to as rumination.
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Rumination. Rachman et al. (2000) found that rumination recollections tend to
be recurrent, intrusive, and interfere with concentration. Rachman and colleagues also

found that engaging in rumination after a social anxiety provoking situation increased the
likelihood of participants avoiding a similar social encounter in the future. However, not

only will individuals with social anxiety be more likely to avoid a similar socially
provoking situation in the future, but they will also continue to ruminate about the former
occasion. For example, research has found that levels of rumination appear to be
relatively stable across time, with levels of rumination on the day of a negative event

predictive of levels of rumination the following day (Lundh & Sperling, 2002). Further
support for the debilitating nature of rumination can be found in the literature that has
examined the types of thoughts and situations that exacerbate the constant negative
dwelling on perceived failures and inadequacies.
One study compared the thoughts of participants high versus low in social anxiety
during a rumination period. Kocovski, Endler, Rector, and Flett (2005) had high and low
socially anxious participants read scripts about two mildly embarrassing social situations
that involved publically making mistakes. Following the reading of the vignettes,
participants in the open-ended instruction condition were told to record any thoughts they
were currently experiencing, while participants in a directive instructions condition were
asked to produce counterfactual thoughts. Counterfactual thoughts consist of notions on
how a situation may have turned out differently. Kocovski and colleagues found that
participants in the high socially anxious group had more negative thoughts in both
conditions compared to the low socially anxious group, and produced more upward
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counterfactual thoughts ("if only" types of statements) compared to the low socially
anxious participants.
Previous research on rumination has also found that it is unique to social
situations, with participants, irrespective of social anxiety status, engaging in higher
levels of rumination after a social event compared to a non-social event (Fehm,
Schneider, & Hoyer, 2007). However, research has found mixed results when comparing

the types of social situations that are associated with higher levels of rumination.
Although previous research has found support that participants high in social anxiety
engage in rumination following a performance situation (Abbott & Rapee, 2004;
Edwards, Rapee, & Franklin, 2003), McEvoy and Kingsep (2006) found that higher
levels of rumination were not associated with either social interaction or performance
situations in a clinical sample with social anxiety disorder. McEvoy and Kingsep's
finding are in contrast with Fehm and colleagues, who found that the type of social
situation (e.g., social situation versus phobic situation) predicted the degree of
rumination. Fehm et al. found that when participants recalled an interaction situation (i.e.,
social situation), they had greater levels of rumination compared to when these
participants recalled a performance situation (i.e., phobic situation), and suggest that this
result may be due to the ambiguity of interaction situations compared to performance
situations. However, it is important to note that Fehm and colleagues did not specifically
screen for levels of social anxiety, and it is possible that there are differences in the
degree of rumination between clinical and non-clinical levels of social anxiety.
In contrast with Fehm et al. 's findings, Kocovski and Rector (2007) found that

when participants completed a rumination questionnaire with a presentation situation in

15

mind, they engaged in significantly more rumination compared to participants who
responded with a party situation in mind. However, the Kocovski and Rector study is
limited in that participants in this study choose whether to respond with either a party
situation or presentation situation in mind. Thus, it is possible that those who chose to
respond with a presentation situation in mind were more likely to report higher levels of
rumination in general.

Overall, the discrepancies in the literature regarding the type of social interaction
situation that elicits the most rumination may be a result of methodological limitations
regarding participant samples. It is possible that social phobies with clinical levels of
social anxiety differ in the degree of rumination for social interaction situations compared
to participants with non-clinical yet high levels of social anxiety. For instance, it is
possible that having clinical levels of social anxiety is associated with high levels of
anxiety for both presentation and social interaction situations. In contrast, a person with
high levels of social anxiety may have lower levels of anxiety for presentation and social
interaction situations.

Previous research has also examined the relationship between attentional biases
and rumination. Morrison and O'Connor (2008) wanted to examine whether rumination
could affect an attentional bias towards negative and positive words, though not in the

context of social anxiety. Morrison and O'Connor had two different manipulations, with
two conditions: mood (negative or positive), and rumination (rumination or distraction).
In the positive mood condition participants listened to uplifting music, alongside with
statements such as, "I have complete confidence in myself. In the negative mood
condition participants listened to slow, downbeat music that was paired with statements
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such as, "Just when I think things are going to get better, something else goes wrong".
For the rumination manipulation participants were instructed to visualize and concentrate
on a series of 45 items during an 8 minute period. In the rumination condition the items
were all related to symptoms, emotions, and the self (e.g., 'Think about: the physical
sensations you feel in your body'). In the distraction condition items were externally
focused away from the self, symptoms, and emotions (e.g., 'Think about: raindrops
sliding down a window pane').
Morrison and O'Connor (2008) had participants tested three separate times.

During time 1, participants completed self report measures of rumination, dysphoria,
hopelessness, and suicidal ideation. Time 2 took place an average of four days later,
where all participants completed a dot probe task to assess baseline measures of their
attentional biases towards negative and positive words. Participants were then randomly

assigned to one of four manipulation groups: negative rumination, positive rumination,
negative distraction, positive distraction. After the experimental manipulations,
participants then completed an additional dot probe task. At the final time point (three
weeks later), participants completed the same self report measures as time 1.
Morrison and O'Connor (2008) found that only the negative rumination and

negative distraction groups showed a significant difference from each other in change in
attentional bias as measured by the dot probe task at pre-and post-manipulation times.
Participants in the negative rumination condition had a decrease towards positive stimuli
in the post-manipulation dot probe task compared to their pre-manipulation dot probe
task results. In contrast, participants in the negative distraction condition showed an
increased attentional bias towards positive stimuli from pre- to post-manipulations on the

17

dot probe task. Although Morrison and O'Connor did not screen for individuals with high
and low levels of dysphoria, these results suggest that rumination takes attention away
from positive words. In general, more research is warranted to investigate the potential
role that rumination has in those with high and low levels of dysphoria, and other
psychopathological conditions, such as social anxiety.
In sum, rumination has been examined using a variety of methods (e.g., self
report, diary methods, social performance/evaluative situations, and experimental
manipulations) and variables (e.g., attentional biases). Although the research is mixed on
whether more rumination follows a performance or interaction situation, researchers
agree that rumination is recurrent, intrusive, and a key component in maintaining social
anxiety.
Overall, these cognitive models help to provide a framework for social anxiety by
describing how factors, such as beliefs about the self, anticipatory and rumination, selffocused attention, and safety behaviours, serve to maintain and exacerbate social phobia.
The conceptualization of cognitive models also helps to explain cognitive biases that
have been found in social anxiety.
Cognitive Biases
Attentional biases in social anxiety disorder have been investigated through the

use of different cognitive paradigms, namely the Stroop task, and the dot probe task. This
section will examine the three different cognitive biases (hypervigilance, avoidance, and
vigilance-avoidance) that have been found in social phobia through the use of cognitive
paradigms.
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Stroop task. The classic Stroop paradigm requires participants to identify the ink
colour of a word that is presented, while ignoring the word meaning. On some of the
trials, the words are colour names that are incongruent with their ink colour (e.g., the
word red printed in green ink). Since word reading is thought to be an automatic process,

it is very difficult to avoid reading the colour name. Therefore, on incongruent trials
response times are considerably longer than neutral (e.g., the word table in green ink) or
congruent (e.g., the word green in green ink) trials for most individuals (Stroop, 1935).
The emotional Stroop task (Gotlib & McCann, 1984) is a variant of this classic

paradigm. In the emotional Stroop task emotional words are presented in coloured font,
and participants have to identify the ink colour while ignoring the word. Hypervigilance
refers to selective attention towards threat related stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. In ,
the emotional Stroop task, hypervigilance towards threat is thought to be reflected by an
increased reaction time (i.e., slower response time) to naming the colour of the threat
related word. Several studies have shown that those who are high in social anxiety are

slower at naming the colour of social threat words compared to non-threat words (Becker,
Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Lundh &
Ost, 1996; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993). However, other studies have not found

support for a hypervigilance towards social threat words (e.g., Amir et al., 1996).
Given the discrepant findings in terms of the cognitive bias with the emotional
Stroop, several studies have focused on the specificity of words that can create an
emotional Stroop interference, with the goal of trying to understand the nature of the

cognitive bias. Spector, Pecknold, and Libman (2003) found that patients with generalized social phobia were slower to name colours of social threat words describing
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negative evaluation (e.g., criticize) and words denoting observable characteristics of
anxiety (e.g., blushing), compared to anxiety words not visible to others (e.g.,

palpitations), and compared to non-anxious controls. In another study on specificity,
McNeil et al. (1995) examined the effects of subtype of social phobia on the emotional

Stroop task. They found that only patients with generalized social phobia (not those with
specific speech-related social phobia) showed greater interference for words relating to
generalized social fears (e.g., party, conversation). However, both groups of patients had
greater interference for words relating to speeches and to negative evaluation. Taken

together, both of these studies provide support for the notion that the cognitive bias for
individuals high in social anxiety may be highly specific.
Over the years, the efficacy of the emotional Stroop as a test to measure cognitive
biases has been questioned, with the following factors serving as alternative explanations
for longer colour naming latencies. First, some researchers believe that threatening words

may create an emotional reaction which inhibits any response and thus leads to longer
reaction times (Cloître, Heimberg, Holt, & Liebowitz, 1992). Second, other researchers
believe that the emotional Stroop may be capturing 'cognitive avoidance'; it is possible
that the longer colour naming latencies may reflect attempts to suppress the threatening
meaning of the word (de Ruiter & Brosschott, 1994). Third, it is possible that the
emotional Stroop effect is a result of mental preoccupation with themes related to the
emotional words, which in turn produces longer colour naming latencies (Wells &

Matthews, 1994). Fourth, Holle, Neely,and Heimberg (1997) found that the manner in
which words are presented in the emotional Stroop accounts for the bias. Holle and
colleagues presented the emotional Stroop to socially anxious participants in either a
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block format, or a randomized format. In a block format, words of the same category are

presented one after the other, and Holle and colleagues found slower response times to
naming the social threat words. However, when words were presented to the socially
anxious participants in a randomized manner, they found no difference between the social
threat and neutral word response times. Holle and colleagues argued that priming was the
reason why slower response times are found when words of the same category are

presented sequentially, as opposed to in a random manner.
Dot probe paradigm. This paradigm circumvents many of the problems of the
emotional Stroop test, and has many advantages: (1) Because two classes of stimuli (e.g.,
threatening and neutral) are presented on the screen simultaneously, it can be said to truly
measure selective attention towards one class of stimuli; (2) an attentional bias is indexed

by a faster response to the probe, therefore factors like mental preoccupation that slow
down a response can be discounted as an explanation for the effect; (3) the paradigm can
assess selective attention towards (hypervigilance) and away (avoidance) from a threat
stimulus.

The dot probe task is a computerized paradigm that first has participants focus their
eyes on a central fixation cross that appears on the screen for 1000 ms. The cross is then
replaced with two stimuli, which are presented one on top of the other for 500 ms. In the
case of social anxiety experiments, one word that is presented would be related to social
threat, such as 'loser', while the other word is neutral, such as 'chair'. Immediately after

the words disappear, a dot appears on the screen in the location where one of the words
previously appeared. The aim of the task is for participants to press the button that
corresponds to the location where the dot appears on the screen.
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Despite the promising appeal of the design of the modified dot-probe task, several
studies have failed to find clear evidence for selective attention to social threat words in

social phobia (Amir, Elias, Klumpp & Przeworski, 2003; Asmundson & Stein, 1994;
Horenstein & Segui, 1997 ) and social anxiety (Mansell, Ehlers, Clark, & Chen, 2002).
Some studies have found support for a hypervigilance towards social threat stimuli,

however their results are qualified. For example, Asmundson and Stein (1994) found
support for a hypervigilance towards social threat words for patients with generalized
social phobia, but only when the social threat word cue was read aloud. However, when
the social threat word was not read out loud (i.e., the neutral word it was paired with was
read), the hypervigilance for probe identification was not found. This finding has lead
some researchers (e.g., Bögeis & Mansell, 2004) to suggest that this study does not
represent a hypervigilance resulting from an attentional bias; rather this study best
exemplifies a hypervigilance that was primed because attention was only preferentially
allocated when the social phobic patients were primed. If hypervigilance was stemming
from an attentional bias, then the expected results would have been faster accuracy
identification times when the probe was paired with the social threat word cue, regardless
of whether the word cue was read aloud. In contrast to a primed hypervigilance, Amir

and colleagues (2003) found that social phobic patients took longer to respond to the
probe when a social threat word occurred in the opposite spatial location, but were no

faster to detect the probe when it occurred in the same location as the social threat word.
Amir and colleagues concluded that their results were indicative of a reduced ability to
disengage from social threat cues (as suggested by Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Musa,
Lepine, Clark, Mansell, and Ehlers (2003) found a hypervigilance to social threat words,
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but only when those with depression were excluded; they found that patients with
depression showed avoidance of social threat words similar to the control group. They
also found that the hypervigilance was specific for social threat words, and not physical
threat words, but only in patients without other comorbid anxiety disorder (e.g.,

generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, or obsessive compulsive disorder). Musa
and colleagues' study suggests that hypervigilance towards social threat cues may only be
possible to identify in 'pure' social anxiety samples.
Other research has found support for a vigilance-avoidance attentional bias.
Vassilopoulos (2005) investigated the nature of the attentional biases in socially anxious
participants in a dot probe task at different time intervals. Vassilopoulos found that
participants high in social anxiety attended to all emotional words (positive, social threat,
and physical threat) when presented for 250 ms. However, when the words were

presented for 500 ms, Vassilopoulos found that the high socially anxious participants
avoided all of the emotional words. These findings support the vigilance-avoidance

hypothesis, although not specific to social threat words. The vigilance-avoidance theory
posits that initially socially anxious individuals will be vigilant towards social threat cues,
but after a certain time period will become avoidant of these cues.
Within the literature researchers noticed that none of the studies examining cognitive
biases were assessing these biases in relation to a social context, and hypothesized that
this could be one of the reasons causing such discrepant findings. Thus, to address the
omission, Mansell et al. (2002) tested whether high and low socially anxious participants

attended to social threat words and positive social words, with and without the presence
of social evaluation (i.e., the threat of a speech). No effect of social anxiety was found,
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but trait general anxiety was associated with attention towards negative relative to
positive social words. The threat of a speech increased attention to positive and negative
social words, but this effect was not specific for those high in social anxiety. Ononaiye,
Turpin, and Reidy (2007) also examined the attentional bias to social threat words by

examining attention to words relating to negative social evaluation with words relating to
anxiety symptoms under conditions of social threat ( a speech) or no threat. They found

that high socially anxious participants showed a hypervigilance to social evaluative
words in the no threat condition, and a hypervigilance towards somatic words (anxiety

symptoms) in the speech condition. One potential reason why a hypervigilance was found
for somatic words in the threat condition could be because those with social anxiety are
most concerned with physically displaying signs of anxiety, such as blushing and

sweating. However, when there is no immediate threat the concerns of socially anxious
individuals may be more focused on social evaluative concerns. Each of these effects
remained when accounting for general trait anxiety and depression. This finding supports

the notion presented by Clark and Wells (1995) that attention may be directed towards
internal threat cues when a real-life social threat is thought to be imminent. In contrast, it

is possible that attention is preferentially allocated externally when the threat stage has
passed, and thé socially anxious individual is trying to assess others evaluative concerns
of his/her performance/interaction.

Overall, the modified dot-probe task using words finds only tentative support for the
vigilance-avoidance hypothesis, with a multitude of factors obscuring a clear
interpretation of the findings, such as problems with disengagement from threat stimuli,
the presence of comorbidity, the timing of presentation, the nature of the social threat
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words, and the presence of a real social threat. Many researchers have suggested that

measuring attention to visually presented words may have limited ecological validity
given that in real social situations the social threat stimuli consist of other people's
responses (e.g., facial expressions and verbal comments). Thus, several studies have
examined selective attention to images of facial expressions using the dot-probe task.
Some research has found evidence for a hypervigilance towards threat (Mogg &

Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, ¦& Bradley, 2004). For example, Mogg et al. (2004)
presented social phobia patients and normal controls with happy-neutral, and angryneutral face pairs at display times of 500 and 1250 ms. Results were similar to

Vassilopoulos' (2005) findings, where they found that at the display time of 500 ms,
social phobia patients selectively attended to the angry faces in contrast to the normal
control participants. However, in support of a vigilance-avoidance model, there was a
non-significant tendency at the display time of 1250 ms for social phobic patients to
negatively, rather than positively, attend to angry faces.
Other studies have found support of avoidance of faces using the modified dot-probe

task. In attempts to mimick the two types of contrasting stimuli which a socially anxious
person may attend to in a real-life situation, Mansell, Clark, Ehlers and Chen (1999)
presented participants with a negative, neutral, or positive face next to an everyday object
(e.g., a chair) for 500 ms. High and low socially anxious participants were in one of two
situations: social-evaluative threat (expecting to give a speech) or no social evaluative
threat. Mansell et al. found that high socially anxious participants in the social evaluative
threat condition attended away from (i.e., avoided) the negative and positive facial
expressions relative to the low socially anxious individuals. No effects of social anxiety
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in the no threat condition were found, but general trait anxiety was associated with

vigilance to negative faces. Chen, Ehlers, Clark, and Mansell (2002) administered the
same paradigm to patients with social phobia and non social phobic controls. Social
phobic patients were found to avoid the facial expressions relative to the control group,
without the presence of an explicit social threat condition. Mansell, Clark, and Ehlers
(2003) examined high to low speech anxious participants by comparing their attention to
external cues (images of faces) with attention to internal cues (a vibration of the finger
thought to indicate changes in the participants' levels of arousal). They found that high
speech anxious participants directed their attention away from external threat and towards
internal cues, but only within the context of expecting to give a speech. No effects were
found in the no-threat condition.

In sum, the modified dot-probe tasks using facial stimuli have found more promising
findings in relation to the word versions. The studies that have found support for
hypervigilance tend to present the images for brief periods of times, or display two faces
simultaneously, and tend to not have a social threat (e.g., speech). In contrast, studies that
have found support for an avoidance of faces tend to display their stimuli for longer
periods of time, or display a face opposite a non-social cue (e.g., object), or tend to use a
real-life social threat. Taken together, these findings suggest that vigilance may result
when the situation is ambiguous as to whether a real social threat is present, and may

occur very quickly. Avoidance may present as a defensive mechanism when the
individual feels as though he/she is being negatively evaluated, and when there is a
neutral non-social threatening stimulus on which to focus attention. Unlike vigilance,
avoidance may take longer to develop.
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Overall, the literature on cognitive paradigms and social anxiety suggests that
there is evidence for hypervigilance, avoidance, and vigilance-avoidance towards socially
threatening stimuli in socially anxious participants. The discrepancy of findings in the
literature may indicate that it is time a different cognitive paradigm is used to assess
cognitive biases in social anxiety. One cognitive paradigm that targets attentional

processes across a small epoch of time is the attentional blink.
The Attentional Blink

The attentional blink (AB) is a task that is used to target attentional processes
across time through using a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) paradigm. In an

RSVP paradigm, a series of stimuli (i.e., words, letters, numbers, and pictures) are
presented in rapid succession in the same location for very brief periods of time, with
participants having to identify one (or more) of the stimuli, which is known as a target.
Although each target is only presented for roughly 100 ms, research has shown that any
single target can be reported accurately (Lawrence, 1971). The distance between targets
in a RSVP stream can be varied, so that researchers can investigate the attentional costs

on identifying the second target (T2) when having to pay attention to the first target (Tl).
Raymond, Shapiro, and Arnell (1992) discovered that when two targets are placed in a
temporal proximity of 200-500 ms of each other, there is a marked decrease in the
accurate identification of T2. Thus, Raymond and colleagues appropriately named this

phenomenon the AB, for it is like an eye-blink of attention during the presentation of T2,
which makes it difficult to identify the second target stimulus. The focus of this section
will be on the AB deficits, and manipulations in AB performance that limits these
deficits.
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Original AB study and model. Raymond and colleagues (1992) based their
original study of the AB on findings from Broadbent and Broadbent (1987), and
Weichselgartner and Sperling (1987), who found that participants displayed a post-target
processing deficit in the identification of stimuli presented after the first target. In the
study by Weichselgartner and Sperling, participants were presented with stimuli in an
RSVP stream and asked to report the lone white letter and the 3 items that immediately
followed the white letter. They discovered that items which were presented 2-4 positions
after the white letter were rarely reported accurately, but items 6-8 positions later were
often reported correctly.

Based on these findings, Raymond and colleagues (1992) wanted to investigate
three main ideas: first, if the post-target processing deficits found in previous research
were due to perceptual or attentional factors. They wanted to see if these deficits were
resulting because individuals did not have the time to see them, or if there was an
attentional disruption preventing them from remembering the stimuli. Second, Raymond
et al. hypothesized that the task Weichselgartner and Sperling (1987) had participants do
was too difficult. Thus, Raymond and colleagues wanted to determine if such large
processing deficits would still be present in a simple detection task, compared to the
relatively difficult task of identifying three items after the target. Last, they wanted to
investigate how items in a close proximity to the target in the RSVP stream contributed to
identification deficits.

Raymond et al. (1992) used the same Tl identification task that Weichselgartner
and Sperling (1987) used, but created a more simplistic T2 task, where participants had to
detect the presence of a black 'X', which was presented 50% of the time after Tl at
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varying lags. For instance, Tl and T2 could be separated anywhere among 1-8 items (see
Figure 3 for presentation of stimuli in a lag 2 trial). Raymond and colleagues also
included a control condition to see if T2 accuracy would improve if not having to focus
on Tl. Results in the control condition showed improved accuracy, with an identification

of T2 greater than 85% at all lags. However, in the experimental condition, where
participants had to identify both Tl and T2, results showed that T2 accuracy was reduced
when T2 was 2 to 5 items after Tl (see Figure 4 ). Thus, the results obtained from this

study suggested that the AB was attentional, and not due to visual limitations.
Theories of the AB.

Early selection model ofthe AB. The early selection model of the AB was
proposed by Raymond et al. (1992) and theorizes that when attention is focused on
identifying Tl, the presence of a distractor immediately following Tl causes confusion to
arise amongst features. This confusion causes a theoretical attentional 'gate' to close, thus
only allowing Tl and the item immediately following Tl to enter in to this first
attentional window. Raymond and colleagues believed that the AB period represents the
amount of time that is required to resolve the interference to allow the attentional 'gate'
to be re-opened. In support of the early selection model theory, Raymond et al. (1992)
found that when a blank space was inserted immediately following Tl, the AB was
greatly attenuated. Thus, because a distractor did not immediately follow Tl, no
confusion arose that would have created interference, thus leaving the attentional window

open. In other words, when a blank space was inserted after Tl, competition between Tl
and the following distractor was reduced, thus keeping the attentional 'gate' open for T2.
However, when Raymond and colleagues inserted a blank space two positions after Tl
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Figure 3.
Illustration of RSVP Stimuli used by Raymond et al. (1992).

T2

30

Figure 4.

Sample AB Pattern Displaying T2 Accuracy When Tl is Correct (Shapiro, Arnell, &
Raymond, 1997).
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(i.e. Tl + 2 position), the AB deficit occurred as usual. Raymond and colleagues
theorized that the distractor immediately following Tl created interference causing the
attentional 'gate' to shut.

More recently, Olivers, van der Stigchel, and Hulleman (2007) found support for
this theory by using four different targets in a RSVP paradigm to investigate the AB.
Olivers and colleagues found that when the four targets were presented sequentially
without any intervening distractors, accuracy for all four targets was high. However,
when a distractor was inserted between the two targets, then the typical AB deficit
occurred. Olivers et al. suggested that the AB period reflects the time required for

attentional processes to put the filter back in place that differentiates targets from
distractors.

Late selection interference model ofthe AB. This model was proposed by
Shapiro, Arnell, and Raymond (1994), and Raymond, Shapiro, and Arnell (1995). This
model posits that we create templates matching target features to discriminate targets
from distractors. In order for targets to enter conscious awareness, they must be
consolidated in to visual short-term memory (VSTM). Due to limitations in capacity,

processing depends upon both the similarity of the stimuli to the template, as well as
presentation order. Therefore, Tl receives priority because it matches the template and is
presented first. Post-target items that immediately follow Tl are admitted to this
consolidation stage due to the proximity to Tl. The reason why T2 is not admitted with
Tl into the consolidation stage when presented in the AB window is because T2 receives
heavy interference from previous distractors and does not receive priority. When Tl and
T2 are separated for more than 500 ms, Tl has been consolidated in to VSTM, and the
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distractors immediately following Tl have been rejected, allowing for T2 to proceed into
VSTM consolidation with little interference. This model requires that T2 receive a high
level of semantic representation before binding.

In support of this model, Shapiro, Driver, Ward, and Sorenson (1997), found that
even when T2 could not be reported, T2 was processed beyond visual features. Shapiro
and colleagues also found that T2s that were not accurately identified primed later items.
Luck, Vogel, and Shapiro (1996) examined Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) and found
that blinked T2s during the AB period received perceptual and semantic processing. Luck
and colleagues suggested that while individuals do not show conscious awareness of
blinked T2s, they still have semantically processed T2.

Bottleneck models ofthe AB. Chun and Potter (1995) examined how
interference from distractors during the AB period may be attributed to any visual event.

To investigate this, Chun and Potter created two experimental conditions, one where
distractors were similar to targets (e.g. digits as distractors and letters as targets) and the
other condition where distractors were dissimilar to targets (e.g. keyboard symbols as

distractors and letters as targets). They found that when distractors were highly dissimilar
from targets, the AB was eliminated, compared to when the distractors were similar to
targets, which produced a modestly attenuated AB. Based on these findings Chun and
Potter proposed a two stage model of the AB, where the AB results from limited capacity
in the second stage of processing.

Similar to Shapiro et al. (1994), and Raymond et al. (1995), Chun and Potter
(1995) believe that all information in the RSVP stream is semantically processed. They
propose that at stage one all information is semantically processed, while at stage two, the
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identification and stimulus consolidation into working memory is performed. This second
stage is demanding on attention as it has a limited capacity, which creates a bottleneck on *
processing information in to awareness. The model proposed by Chun and Potter differs
from the model proposed by Shapiro and colleagues in that the competition of items for

stage 2 consolidation creates a bottleneck. Chun and Potter posit that if Tl is in stage 2,
then T2 has to wait until Tl consolidation is complete before it can undergo Stage 2.

During this waiting period T2 is vulnerable to decay, causing it to be unavailable for
stage 2 consolidation once the bottleneck has cleared. When Tl and T2 are separated by a
long lag, Tl consolidation is completed before T2 is presented; thus T2 does not have to
wait at a bottleneck, which results in higher T2 accuracy identification.
The temporary loss ofcontrol (TLC) model. The TLC model was proposed by Di
Lollo, Kawahara, Ghorashi, and Enns (2005), and posits that the attentional system

selects target items for further processing through the use of input filters, also known as
/ an attentional set. Di Lollo and colleagues believe that while Tl is being processed,
attentional resources are focused on the processing of Tl, which leaves the input filters
vulnerable and creates a temporary loss of control over incoming stimulus selection. If T2

is in the Tl + 1 position, then accuracy is spared because T2 matches the attentional set.
If a distractor is in the Tl + 1 position, the input filter becomes biased towards the
distractor features and subsequent T2s will not be selected for further attentional
processing because T2 no longer matches the attentional set. Once Tl processing is
complete, the attentional set template regains attentional control and is corrected to match
the target set, causing increased T2 accuracy.
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To support this theory, Di Lollo et al. (2005) found that when stimuli with the
same defining features (e.g. all were letters presented amongst digits) were presented
sequentially, there was no observed AB deficit on the third item. However, when the
second and third items did not share the same target features (e.g. letter, digit, letter), the
typical AB deficit pattern was observed.
Factors that influence AB performance. Ever since the AB was discovered,
researchers have been manipulating various variables in attempts to attenuate, or enlarge,
the AB. Previous research suggests that there are many ways in which the AB can be

manipulated, ranging from individual differences, such as working memory (Colzato,
Spape, Pannebakker, & Hommel, 2007), to using personally salient stimuli (Shapiro,
Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997).
Researchers have found that personally relevant stimuli affects the AB. Shapiro et

al. (1997) found what they termed the 'visual cocktail party' effect in the AB. For the
second target, participants saw nouns, their own names, and other names. Shapiro and
colleagues found that when a participant's own name was presented as T2 within the
attentional blink window, the participant did not show an AB. However, participants did
show an AB for nouns and other names. The findings of this study suggest that highly
salient material, such as one's own name, can override the AB, but that names in general

are not salient enough material. These findings led researchers to examine other highly
salient material in the AB, such as emotional words.
Emotional words and the AB. Emotional words have been found to attenuate the

AB, supporting the notion that emotionally arousing information is preferentially selected
from the temporal stream. Keil and Ihssen (2004) examined the effect that emotional
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words have on the AB paradigm, with T2 words either being pleasant (e.g., love),

negative (e.g., murder), or neutral (e.g., browse). They found that compared to neutral
words, pleasant and unpleasant words had an attenuated AB, but that there was no
difference in AB sparing between pleasant and unpleasant words. Keil and Ihssen also
found that the emotional words that were not rated high in terms of arousal did not show
an attenuated AB compared to emotional words that were rated highly in terms of

arousal. These findings suggest that it is not the emotional content of words that is
preferentially selected, but rather how arousing the words themselves are that captures
attention.

Anderson (2005) also conducted a series of experiments to examine the AB when
T2 were emotional words. Anderson compared T2 stimuli that were either negative

words (e.g., murder), to taboo words (e.g., lesbian), and neutral words (e.g., browse).
Anderson found that taboo words produced the greatest AB sparing, with negative words

having a slightly attenuated AB, while neutral words displayed the typical AB pattern. In
support of Keil and Ihssen's (2004) findings, Anderson found that it was the arousal
ratings of the words, and not the valence ratings, that accounted for this AB sparing. For
example, if a word was either highly pleasant or highly unpleasant, but not arousing, the
AB would only be slightly attenuated for that word compared to if the word was rated as
highly arousing. Anderson suggests that this occurs because T2 that are highly arousing
require less attention for correct identification, which makes them less vulnerable to
attentional limitations that underlie the AB. More recent research, conducted by
Mathewson, Arnell, and Mansfield (2008) confirms that arousal, and not valence ratings,

predicts accuracy identification levels. Mathewson et al. found that compared to
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negative, positive, and neutral words, that taboo words created the largest AB when
presented as Tl, which the authors suggest is due to the arousal level of taboo words.

The AB andpsychopathology/mood. There have also been a few studies that
have investigated psychopathology, specifically dysphoria, and the AB. Rokke, Arnell,
Koch, and Andrews (2002) examined the AB amongst non-dysphoric, mild-dysphoric,
and moderate to severe dysphoric undergraduate students. Similar to the original AB

study done by Raymond et al. (1992), Rokke and colleagues used black letters as
distractors, with Tl as a white letter, and T2 as identifying the presence of a black 'x'.

Rokke and colleagues found that there was no difference in the size of the AB deficit for
non-dysphoric compared to mild-dysphoric participants. However, participants that
experience moderate to severe levels of dysphoria were found to have a longer and larger
AB deficit. Rokke et al. suggested that one possible reason for this could be that these

participants who experienced moderate to severe levels of dysphoria may have had
difficulty disengaging attention from the Tl stimulus, thus taking longer to consolidate
Tl into short term memory. Despite the deficits experienced by moderate to severe

dysphoric participants on the dual task, no difference was found amongst the groups for
accuracy levels when participants were instructed to only pay attention to identifying the
presence or absence of the 'x'. While Rokke and colleagues did not use emotional
stimuli, this study suggests that individuals who experience moderate to severe levels of
dysphoria may have attentional impairments that are exaggerated in dual task conditions.
A recent study by Koster, De Raedt, Verschuere, Tibboel, and de Jong (2009)
found support for the notion that dysphoric individuals have an impaired ability to
disengage from stimuli. Koster et al. examined the AB for emotional words in dysphoric
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and non-dysphoric undergraduate students. Targets were green words that were
presented amongst white neutral distractor words. Tl was always an emotional word
(either positive or negative), while T2 was always a neutral word. Koster and colleagues
found that when negative words were presented as Tl, T2 identification was significantly
impaired for the dysphoric participants compared to the non-dysphoric participants.

Thus, having a negative word as Tl created a larger AB in the dysphoric participants.
These findings suggest problems with the dysphoric participants' ability to disengage
from a negative stimulus. No difference in AB deficits was found when comparing
positive words between the dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants.
Social anxiety and the AB. To date, there have only been three studies that have

looked at social anxiety and the AB. Arend and Botella (2002) found that individuals
high in trait social anxiety showed an attenuated AB for emotionally valenced words
compared to participants low in trait social anxiety. Arend and Botella had participants
identify a white word (Tl) and detect if a probe word (T2) was present. The white word
used as Tl was presented as either a social threat word (e.g., fear), or neutral word (e.g.,
tree). Participants that were high in trait anxiety had a higher correct T2 detection rate
when Tl was a threat word, compared to when Tl were neutral words, and compared to

low trait anxious participants. The authors suggest that the presence of a threat Tl caused
an attenuated AB due to the automatic processing of threat related material in high trait
anxious individuals. Thus, participants who were high in trait social anxiety were more
accurate in identifying T2 when Tl was a threat word because TI could be processed with
less attentional resources, which would create less of a processing bottleneck to form.

Arend and Botella's findings support a hypervigilance towards social threat words for

38

high trait anxious participants. If threat related material caused individuals high in
anxiety to avoid the stimulus, then no attenuated AB would have been found. An
avoidance of a Tl threat stimulus would be indicative of reduced scores regardless of lag

position. If a participant was engaging in the avoidance of a Tl stimulus, then it would be
expected that accuracy identification scores for Tl would be very low. Given that trials
are only counted as 'accurate' if both Tl and T2 words are correctly identified, low
identification scores at Tl would subsequently affect overall accuracy scores. In terms of
limitations for Arend and Botella' s study, it is important to note that participants in this

study were only assessed for trait levels of social anxiety, and it may be possible that
state levels are also important in determining the nature of the cognitive bias in social
anxiety. Although Arend and Botella investigated how threat words would impact
detecting a word as T2, it is possible that detecting a word requires less cognitive effort
than identifying a word. Furthermore, it has yet to be examined if low and high socially
anxious participants differ on identifying both Tl and T2 words, where T2 is a threat
related word.

The second study done with socially anxious participants and the AB was by de

Jong and Martens (2007), who presented participants with happy and angry faces as
stimuli in an AB task. Both Tl and T2 could be happy or angry faces, which produced
four different combinations of Tl and T2 stimuli. Distractions amongst the two targets

consisted of neutral faces. Participants were instructed to press a button for the emotional
face(s) they saw in each stream. Results indicated that all participants showed an
increased identification rate for T2 when Tl was an angry face. However, this AB

attenuation was not significantly different between those high in social anxiety compared
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to those low in social anxiety. The authors also found a "backwards blink" where a happy
Tl deficit was present when an angry T2 was presented. Once again, this finding was not
especially pronounced in the high socially anxious participants. A limitation of the study
was that the authors only used happy and angry faces for targets, and did not use neutral
faces as either Tl or T2. Thus, it is unclear as to whether the interfering effect of angry

faces at T2 on Tl happy face identification was due to preferential processing of angry
faces overall, or to a superior identification of angry faces as Tl.
Thus, the third study examining social anxiety and the AB was an extension of the

previously mentioned study, whereby de Jong, Koster, van Wees, and Martens (2009)
wanted to address these concerns through the inclusion of neutral non-facial stimuli (i.e.,
letters containing circular, face-shape properties, like the letter 'p') at Tl, and neutral,
angry, and happy facial stimuli at T2. De Jong and colleagues found that the AB was
attenuated for emotional faces, but this finding was irrespective of social anxiety, and

suggests that in general, emotional expressions are processed more efficiently compared
to neutral expressions. Perhaps one reason why the authors did not find any difference
between social anxiety groups for identification of angry faces was because participants

were not subjected to a social threat (i.e., a speech). It is possible that the cognitive bias
only asserts itself when a socially anxious individual is in a threatening
situation/environment, such as having to give a speech, or interact with a stranger.
Although the three studies that have looked at social anxiety with an AB
paradigm provide some encouraging results, further investigation is required. Arend and
Botella (2002) found support for a hypervigilance towards threat related stimuli in an AB
paradigm; however, in their study they presented their threat stimuli as Tl, as opposed to
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at T2. Thus, their study is limited in that it did not measure how socially anxious
individuals are able to attend to threatening stimuli when they are being forced to pay
attention to another stimulus in their environment. Furthermore, their study was not done
within the context of a socially threatening environment. Although de Jong and

colleagues (2007; 2009) did compare high and low anxious participants with facial
stimuli at both Tl and T2, no difference was found between the high and low socially

anxious participants in either study. Once again, neither of their studies was conducted
within the context of a socially threatening environment, which may account for their
lack of differentiation between social anxiety groups. Although some researchers may

argue that within the context of social anxiety, facial stimuli are more ecologically valid
to use, the current research sought to first compare threat related words between high and
low socially anxious participants on an AB task before using facial stimuli. Given that the
only study on social anxiety and the AB to find differences between high and low
socially anxious participants used words, it was deemed an appropriate starting place.
The past studies on social anxiety and the AB are also limited in that they did not
assess the cognitive bias under a threatening social environment. This is an important
limitation, given that previous research examining social anxiety and attentional biases
has found the presence of a threat to have an impact on the attentional bias (e.g., Mansell
et al., 2002; Ononaiye et al., 2002). Another important limitation of the previous social
anxiety and AB studies is that none of them took into account any factors of the cognitive
model of social anxiety that are hypothesized to exacerbate and maintain anxiety, such as
rumination. Given that previous research (Morrison & O' Connor, 2008) has found
rumination to have an impact on attentional biases, albeit not in the context of social
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anxiety, it seems logical to explore the effect rumination may have on the biases in social
anxiety.
Present Research

Cognitive models of anxiety disorders suggest the existence of an attentional
processing bias to information related to anxiety. It is hypothesized that such preferential
processing serves to exacerbate and maintain the disorder. However, there appears to be a

discrepancy in the literature as to the nature of the bias. For example, some research has
shown that anxious individuals show a hypervigilance bias to threatening material in their
environment (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). In contrast, other
research has found that anxious individuals avoid threatening material (e.g., de Ruiter &
Brosschot, 1994). Adding to the confusion, the traditional paradigms used to assess
biased attention in social anxiety have fallen under criticism, namely the emotional

Stroop and the dot-probe tasks (Amir et al., 1996; Asmundson & Stein, 1994). Thus, the
use of a different cognitive paradigm, such as the AB, may help clarify previous findings.
Therefore, the current studies examined how socially anxious individuals responded to

social threat stimuli in an AB paradigm, and if their AB was attenuated for social threat
words. Because rumination is thought to play a key role in the maintenance of social

anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995), and previous research has found rumination to affect
cognitive biases (Morrison & O'Connor, 2008), the current research also examined the
effect that rumination had on the AB.

The first study examined whether participants high in social anxiety differed from
those low in social anxiety in AB magnitude to social threat words at T2. Social threat
words were placed as T2, in contrast to Arend and Botella (2002) who placed their threat
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Stimuli at Tl, because of the desire to examine attentional costs in the attentional bias
when a participant is forced to pay attention to a non-threatening stimulus. It was
hypothesized that participants who were high in social anxiety would have an attenuated
AB for social threat words, compared to participants low in social anxiety, and compared
to control words. Given that previous research has found avoidance of threat stimuli to
set in after periods of 1250 ms (Mogg et al., 2004), a hypervigilance, indexed by an
attenuated AB, was hypothesized given that the AB period occurs within 200-500 ms. At
the end of the first study participants were provided with a list of target and probe words,
and were asked to rate how anxiety provoking each word was on a 7-point Likert scale. It
was hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety would find the social threat
probe words to be more anxiety provoking than participants low in social anxiety.
The second study investigated the role of rumination on the AB in participants

that were either high or low in social anxiety. Upon completion of a 5-minute impromptu
speech, all participants were given standardized negative feedback. After examining their
feedback, participants were divided into either a rumination or a distraction condition. In
the rumination condition, participants answered questions based on their feedback that

were geared towards having them engage in rumination. In the distraction condition
participants completed a visual distraction task. Following the rumination/distraction
condition, participants then completed an AB task similar to the one utilized in Study 1. It
was hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety, and in the rumination condition,
would show the greatest attenuated AB for social threat words compared to participants
high in social anxiety and in the distraction condition, and compared to participants low
in social anxiety in either the rumination or distraction condition. In comparison to Study
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1, it was hypothesized that the attenuation of the AB for social threat words for
participants high in anxiety in the rumination condition would exceed any attenuation
found for high socially anxious participants for threat words in Study 1 .
Study 1 - The Effects of Threatening Stimuli Words in an Attentional Blink
Paradigm with Socially Anxious Individuals

This study examined the effects of socially threatening words on participants with
high and low levels of social anxiety in an AB paradigm. It was hypothesized that
participants with high levels of social anxiety would show an attenuated AB when a

threat related word was placed as a second target in a RSVP paradigm, compared to
participants that were low in social anxiety. It was also hypothesized that participants
high in social anxiety would rate the social threat words as more anxiety provoking,
compared to participants low in social anxiety.
Method

Participants

Participants consisted of 38 students at Wilfrid Laurier University (WLU) in
Ontario, who were recruited for the study based on their social anxiety scores obtained

through the 3 item Miniature Social Phobia Interaction scale (Mini-SPIN; Connor,
Kobak, Churchill, Katzelnick, & Davidson, 2001; see Appendix B). Participants, who on
the Mini-SPIN scored below 3, or above 6, were invited to participate in the study. The
decision to use cutoff scores of 3 and 6 was based on previous literature that found these

scores to be the optimal cutoff point for sensitivity (i.e., the percentage of cases of social
anxiety disorder that were correctly identified), specificity (i.e., the percentage of patients
without social anxiety disorder correctly identified), and diagnostic efficiency (i.e.,
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overall hit rate) for social anxiety (Connor et al., 2001). Twenty participants with scores
under 3, and 1 8 participants with scores over 6 participated. The participants' ages ranged
from 18 to 25, and the majority of participants reported their ethnicity as Caucasian. For
participation in the study participants received $11 compensation (see consent form in
Appendix A).

Social anxiety group classification. Participants whose Mini-SPIN scores fell
under 3 were considered to be low in social anxiety, and those with scores over 6 were

considered as high in social anxiety. Initially, the Mini-SPIN identified 19 participants as
low in social anxiety and 19 participants as high in social anxiety. However, upon
examination of anxiety scores, it was revealed that two participants were identified by the
Mini-SPIN with scores under 3, yet their scores on the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale

(SIAS) and Social Phobia Scale (SPS), which were the in lab measures of social anxiety,
indicated that they were high, not low, in social anxiety. Thus, these two participants
were placed in the high social anxiety group because there is greater support for the
validity of the SIAS/SPS for undergraduate samples compared to the Mini-SPIN and both
the SIAS and SPS scores were measured on the day participants came into the lab. Thus,

participants' scores on the day of testing revealed that they were exhibiting signs of high,
opposed to low, social anxiety, and were grouped accordingly. Four participants had
Mini-SPIN scores above 6, but their scores on the SIAS and SPS measures indicated that
they were average to low in social anxiety, and were therefore categorized as low in
social anxiety. Thus, a decision was made to categorize participants as high in social
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anxiety if their SIAS score was 26 or greater, or low in social anxiety if their score was
24 or below1.
Data was screened for outliers; three English-second-language (ESL) participants
were excluded from analyses due to poor accuracy on the RSVP task. According to both
the Mini-SPIN and the SIAS, two of the ESL participants were identified as high in social

anxiety, and the other ESL participant was identified as low in social anxiety. With the
elimination of the three ESL participants, the following analyses are based on a sample of
20 participants low in social anxiety, and 15 participants high in social anxiety. See Table
1 for demographic information.
Measures

Demographic questionnaire. A demographic questionnaire was administered to
participants asking them to provide information about their age, highest level of
education, current living situation, marital and occupational status and ethnicity in a
closed-ended format (see Appendix C).

Social anxiety. For the prescreening of social anxiety, the Mini-SPIN was
administered via a telephone conversation with potential participants. Identification

information of potential participants was acquired through an online data base of WLU
students who expressed interest in participating in research studies over the summer for

monetary compensation. The Mini-SPIN (Connor et al., 2001) is a three-item measure
that was derived from the 17-item Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000),
1 Analyses were run excluding participants whose Mini-SPIN scores were not consistent with their SIAS
scores (i.e., participants who were identified as low or high in social anxiety on the Mini-SPIN, and then
identified as the opposite on the in lab SIAS). Analyses run with these participants excluded found the
same pattern of results on the 2 ? 3 ? 2 ANOVA with a main effect of lag, a main effect of word, and a lag
by word interaction. This provides support for the classification of participants with SIAS scores below 24
as low in social anxiety, and above 26 as high in social anxiety.
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Table 1

Demographic Information by Condition for Study 1 (N = 35)
HSA
Frequency
«=15%

LSA
« = 20

Frequency
Gender
Female
Male

%

8
7

53.3
46.7

12
8

60.0
40.0

1
2
10

6.7
13.3
66.7

0
2
15

0.0
10.0
75.0

6.7
6.7

2
1

10.0
5.0

Education

Completed Part of High school
Graduate High school
Completed Part of University
Graduated from University:
Undergraduate Degree
Master's Degree

1
1

Marital Status

Single
Married

Cohabiting
Separated
Occupational Status
Unemployed
Employed Full - Time
Employed Part - Time
Student Full - Time
Student Part - Time
Other

14
0
0
1

93.3
0.0
0.0
6.7

18
1
1
0

90.0
5.0
5.0
0.0

1
0
1
12
1
0

6.7
0.0
6.7
80.0
6.7
0.0

2
1
0
13
3
1

10.0
5.0
0.0
65.0
15.0
5.0

9
3
1
2

60.0
20.0
6.7
13.3

15
5
0
0

75.0
25.0
0.0
0.0

Ethnicity
White/ Caucasian
Asian

Hispanic
Other
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and is used to identify the levels of generalized social anxiety that a person possesses.
Similar to the SPIN, the Mini-SPIN asks participants to indicate the degree that the

statement is characteristic or true of the person, ranging on a 5-point Likert scale from 0
(not at all) to 4 (extremely) characteristic (see Appendix B). Weeks, Spokas, and

Heimberg (2007) did a psychometric evaluation of the Mini-SPIN on a treatment seeking
sample of social phobies. Weeks and colleagues found the Mini-SPIN to have strong
internal consistency, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. Although the MiniSPIN has been found to demonstrate good psychometric properties, it should be noted

that psychometric properties have not been assessed in a non-clinical, undergraduate
population.
Two standardized measures of social anxiety were used in the lab to assess the
different aspects of social anxiety. Social anxiety is characterized by fears of being

negatively observed by others, and showing physical signs of distress. The SPS (Mattick
& Clarke, 1998) is a 20 item scale that assesses fears of being observed by others during
routine activities, such as becoming self conscious when using public toilets. Participants

are given statements, such as "I worry about shaking or trembling when I'm watched by
other people", and are asked to indicate the degree they feel the statement is characteristic
or true of them based on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely)

characteristic (see Appendix D). The SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) is a 20 item scale
that was developed in conjunction with the SPS, and is used to assess anxiety in social
interaction situations. Participants are given statements, such as "I feel I'll say something

embarrassing when talking", and are asked to indicate the degree they feel the statement
is characteristic or true of them based on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all)
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to 4 (extremely) characteristic (see Appendix E). Research has found both the SIAS and
SPS to have excellent internal consistency (Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, & Hope, 1992) and
good validity (Mattick & Clarke, 1998).

Depression. Social anxiety is often accompanied by depression, and a
standardized measure of depression was used to assess the severity of depressive
symptoms in the past week. The measure of depression was included so that it could be
used as a covariate in analyses. The widely used and validated Beck Depression

Inventory (BDI-II: Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; see Appendix F) was used for this
purpose. This 21 -item scale is comprised of items relating to symptoms of depression
including hopelessness, irritability, guilt, punishment, fatigue, weight loss, and lack of
interest in sex. This scale consists of groups of statements where participants are asked to

indicate the statement for each question that best describes the way they have felt in the
past week. The statements range on a scale of 0 to 3, with higher numbers indicating a
higher degree of depressive symptoms. Beck et al. (1996) have shown that this scale is
valid and reliable to use across various populations.
RSVP stimuli. The RSVP task was programmed using the experimental software

SuperLab Pro by Cedras, Version 4.0. The list of words contained one red word, which
was the target stimulus (Tl), and one green word, which was the probe stimulus (T2),
that were presented among a series of black words (see Figure 5). The green words were
presented in one of eight positions in relation to the red target word; this is known as
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) and allows for the charting of attention availability
(Raymond et al., 1992). Each participant was presented with a total of 256 trials (128
trials per experimental and control blocks). In the original AB study letters were
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Figure 5.
Representation of RSVP Stimuli.
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presented for 15 milliseconds on an inter-stimulus interval of 75 milliseconds (Raymond
et al., 1992). However, because the word stimuli in the present studies ranged in length
from three to 1 1 letters, it required a longer presentation rate. Thus, the presentation rate
for the words in each trial was 15 milliseconds, with an inter-stimulus interval of 100

milliseconds. Neutral words were presented in red font as target one (Tl), and probe
words, which consisted of either social threat words or vegetables, were presented in
green font as the second target (T2; see Figure 6). The target words were matched on
word length and frequency (Francis & Kucera, 1982).
Procedure

A procedural diagram outlining the main steps for Study 1 is presented in Figure
7. Participants whose scores on the mini-SPIN were below 3 or above 6 were invited to
participate in the current study. Participants were run individually with one experimenter
in the laboratory with them. Upon arrival participants first completed the informed
consent (see Appendix A), which outlined the important aspects of the current study.

Following the informed consent, participants were given a questionnaire package, which
included the demographic questionnaire, the SPS, the SIAS, and the BDI. Next

participants were seated at a computer and presented with the following instructions for
the experimental block of the RSVP task: "You will be presented with a series of words.

Among them will be one red word, and one green word". They were then instructed to
press the space bar to continue on to the next screen, which contained the following
information: "At the end of each trial your task is to type the red word and the green word

that you saw". At the end of each trial participants were prompted by a screen with
information telling them to type in the red word they saw, and then to press the space bar

Figure 6.
Word Pairings of RSVP Stimuli for Study 1.

Target Words

Probe
Threat

Words
Control

address

collect

anxious

journal

bargain
laundry

ashamed

awkward

pumpkin
parsley
peaches

shovel
dressmaker

boring

orange

criticized

strawberry

registrar

fragrance

disgraced

mushrooms

said

chin

dull

test

curb

pear
lime

maintenance

grandfather

quarter

shelter

contact

garment

population
researching

economical

dumb
embarrassed
failure
foolish
humiliated

created
annual

television

cranberries
lettuce

cabbage
vegetables

incompetent cauliflower
inept
apple

vacation

consolidate
towel
umbrella

inferior

radishes

videos

thread

lottery

judged
jittery

grapes

confirm
media

loser

melon

mortified

program

infer
advertise
leather

nervous

pineapple
spinach

sun

pot

odd

pea

swimming
relay

decorate

rejected
shaky
shy
stammering
stupid

tomatoes

think

determine

eagle

cat

fox

everything

translator

intern

coconut

lemon

fig
blackberry

sweet

dealer
dresser
cloud

finish

remedy

uneasy

celery

options

florist

uptight

raisins

news

golf

corn

event

seize

weak
weird

imagine

stutter
tense

pepper
carrots

fruit

beans
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Figure 7.
Procedural Diagram Outlining the Main Steps of Study 1 .

Screening

Questionnaires
Demographics
SIAS
SPS
BDI

RSVP Task

Word Ratings
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to continue on to the next screen. This next screen prompted participants to type in the
green word they saw. Each trial was initiated by the participant by pressing the space bar,
and beginning with a row of fixation crosses (+++++) that were presented at the center of
the screen. Participants were then given 10 practice trials.
For the control block participants were instructed to type only the green (probe)

words they saw, even though the red (target) words were still present. The computerized
trials were identical, with only the instructions differing. For the control block,
participants were instructed to only focus on identifying the green (probe) words. The

purpose of this control block was to confirm the presence of the AB period. Because
attention is only being directed towards processing one target (the green word), this
should be a relatively easy task with a low error identification rate.
The instructions for the control block were: "This second half of the experiment is
different. Now focus on identifying only the green words". A second screen of

instructions presented the following information: "Once again, we will begin with
practice trials". Lastly, participants were instructed to: "Remember. Ignore the red words.
Please identify and type only the green words". As with the experimental block,

participants were prompted at the end of each trial with a screen that asked them to type
out the green word they saw. Consistent with the experimental block, each trial was
initiated by the participant pressing the space bar, and began with a row of fixation
crosses (+++++) that were presented at the center of the screen. Similar to the
experimental block, participants were given 10 practice trials.
Word ratings. Upon completing the RSVP task participants were given a list of

96 alphabetically organized words, and asked to rate how anxiety provoking they found
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each word to be on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely)
anxiety provoking. This list contained the target (red) words, and the probe (green) words
that were used in the RSVP task (see Appendix H).
Data Analysis
To test the hypothesis that participants with high levels of social anxiety would
show an attenuated attentional blink when a threat related word is placed as a second
target in a RSVP paradigm compared to participants that are low in social anxiety, a
repeated measures 2 Word (threat vs. control) X 3 Lag (2 vs. 3 vs. 8) X 2 Group (high vs.
low socially anxious) analysis of variance was carried out. Comparison of word accuracy

at lags 2, 3, and 8 were selected based on previous studies that have examined these lags
(i.e., de Jong & Martens, 2007). To test the hypothesis that participants high in social
anxiety would rate the social threat words as more anxiety provoking, compared to

participants low in social anxiety, a i-test was run to compare the mean scores for the
high socially anxious group to the mean scores of the low socially anxious group. A Mest
was also run to test the hypothesis that threat words were more anxiety provoking
compared to control words.
Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 provides a summary of the means and standard deviations for the
measures of social anxiety and depression across the high and low social anxiety
conditions. In order to ensure that the HSA and LSA group significantly differed on these

measures, independent sample ¿-tests were conducted. These analyses resulted in
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Table 2

Social Anxiety and Depression Measures by Social Anxiety Groupfor Study 1

(N = 35)
HSA

LSA

M ? = 15 SD

M « = 20 SD

t

Alpha

Mini -SPIN

6.54

1.98

3.12

1.90

4.80**

SIAS

39.73

10.31

15.10

5.35

9.19**

.94

SPS

26.93

9.97

10.30

5.11

6.44**

.89

BDI

15.33

6.84

8.90

5.69

3.04*

.84

Note. HSA = High Social Anxiety; LSA = Low Social Anxiety; Mini-SPIN =
Miniature Social Phobia Interaction Scale; SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale;
SPS = Social Phobia Scale; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory
*/?<.05
**£><. 001
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significant í-values, which indicated that participants in the HSA condition differed on

social anxiety and depression measures from participants in the LSA condition.
Word Ratings

Participants were instructed to indicate how anxiety provoking they found a list
social threat and control words on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7
(extremely) anxiety provoking. It was hypothesized that participants high in social

anxiety would rate the social threat words as more anxiety provoking, compared to
participants low in social anxiety. To assess this, an independent i-test was conducted,
with the results indicating that HSA participants rated threat words as more anxiety

provoking compared to LSA participants (t (33) = 2.71,/? < .05). An independent ¿-test was
also conducted on the control words to examine if participants differed in how anxiety

provoking they found neutral words. The groups did not differ in how anxiety provoking
they found the control words to be (t (33) = -1.24, ? = .22). See Table 3. Taken together
these results provide validity that our social threat words were more threatening to those
who were high in social anxiety than those low in social anxiety.
Anxiety ratings for each word that was presented as Tl are displayed in Table 4,
and anxiety ratings for each threat and control word presented as T2 are displayed in
Tables 5 and 6, respectively. As denoted by ampersands in Table 5, 18 threat words were

added to the word rating list after 24 participants had completed the study. These
additional threat words were added to the word rating list because preliminary analysis of

threat words revealed that participants did not find some of the original threat words (e.g.,
dull) to be very anxiety provoking. Thus, the additional words were added so that the
words rated the most anxiety provoking could be used as threat word stimuli for Study 2.
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Table 3

t-Test Comparing HSA to LSA Groups on Threat and Control Word Ratingsfor Study
1 (N = 35)
HSA

N

LSA

W = 15

Threat Words

t

?

2.71

< .05

-1.24

.22

? = 20

M

SD

M

SD

4.02

1.39

2.79

1.29

Control Words
1.06
0.09
1.26
0.64
Note. HSA = High Social Anxiety; LSA = Low Social Anxiety
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Table 4

Anxiety Ratingsfor Target 1 Wordsfor Study 1 (N = 35)
HSA
? = 15

__________________M

LSA
« = 20

SD

M

SD

1.06

1.70

1.22

1.73

1.22

1.79

1.36

1.07
1.00

0.26
0.00

1.25
1.00

0.55
0.00

Collect
Consolidate

1.67
1.80

1.11
1.21

1.65
2.15

1.04
1.14

Curb

1.33

0.82

1.20

0.41

Dealer
Decorate
Dresser

1.87
1.40
1.20

1.30
0.83
0.56

1.90
1.35
1.35

1.07
0.81
0.88

Dressmaker

1.33

0.82

1.70

1.30

Eagle

1.27

0.80

1.20

0.70

Economical

1.80

1.21

1.90

1.29

Florist

1.00

0.00

1.05

0.22

Fox

1.13

0.35

1.15

0.67

Fragrance

1.23

0.78

1.25

0.44

Garment
Golf
Grandfather

1.00
1.53
1.47

0.00
1.13
1.55

1.25
1.05
1.50

0.55
0.22
1.19

Infer

1.33

0.82

2.00

1.49

Laundry

1.20

0.56

1.35

0.99

Leather

1.07

0.26

1.20

0.52

Lottery

1.13

0.52

1.35

0.67

Pot

1.40

1.12

1.40

0.73

Remedy

1.47

1.55

1.30

0.57

Seize
Shelter
Shovel
Thread
Towel

1.73
1.67
1.07
1.07
1.00

1.10
1.45
0.26
0.26
0.00

1.75
1.15
1.15
1.20
1.05

1.25
0.37
0.37
0.52
0.22

Translator

1.40

0.91

1.25

0.44

Umbrella

L00

O1OO

1.30

0.92

Advertise

1.47

Bargain
Chin
Cloud

Note. HSA = High Social Anxiety; LSA = Low Social Anxiety
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Table 5

Anxiety Ratingsfor Threat Wordsfor Study 1 (N = 35)
______________

M

HSA

LSA

« = 15

? = 20

SD

M

Sp_

Anxious
Ashamed
Awkward

5.00
5.13
5.20

1.85
1.41
1.21

3.25
3.20
3.40

1.62
1.51
1.60

Boring
Clumsy*

2.47
2.67

1.77
1.21

2.35
1.75

1.46
0.89

Criticized

4.93

2.19

3.35

1.93

Despise*
Disgraced
Disgust*

3.17
4.87
3.83

1.94
1.19
2.23

3.88
3.20
2.75

2.10
1.67
1.49

Disliked*
Dull
Dumb
Embarrassed
Failure
Foolish
Humiliated
Hurtful*
Idiot*

4.17
2.27
3.60
5.10
5.73
3.60
4.93
2.83
3.50

1.33
1.67
1.92
1.44
1.28
1.96
1.58
1.47
1.38

4.63
1.85
2.80
3.10
4.30
2.55
3.40
3.13
3.75

1.51
1.14
1.79
1.62
1.75
1.54
1.82
1.64
1.91

Inadequate*
Incompetent
Inept

4.17
4.87
3.60

1.83
1.81
2.10

4.13
3.55
3.00

1.96
1.61
1.82

Inferior
Insecure*

4.20
3.83

2.01
1.72

3.25
3.88

1.68
1.73

Jittery
Judged
Lonely*

3.47
4.73
3.67

2.13
1.58
1.21

2.20
2.95
4.75

1.64
1.99
1.39

Loser
Mortified
Nervous
Odd
Outcast*

4.00
3.40
4.60
3.13
4.17

2.17
2.23
1.96
2.07
1.17

2.75
2.55
2.85
2.25
4.13

1.62
1.79
1.73
1.41
1.46

Rejected
Repulsive*

4.60
3.83

1.84
1.72

3.60
3.50

1.88
1.41

Ridicule*

3.50

1.76

2.88

1.55

Shaky

3.20

1.47

2.35

1.60

Shunned*

3.00

1.41

3.38.

2.26

Shy

3.67

2.16

1.95

1.28

Stammering

2.33

2.02

2.50

2.12

Stupid

3.60

1.99

2.70

1.81
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Stutter

3.27

2,09

2.75

2.10

Tense

4.33

2.02

2.45

1.61

Ugly*

3.67

0.82

4.25

2.37

Uneasy

3.93

1.71

2.10

1.12

Unloved*
Unsuccessful*

5.00
4.67

1.26
1.21

5.50
4.50

2.07
1.77

Unworthy*
Upright

4.67
3.53

1.75
1.92

4.13
2.20

1.81
1.36

Weak
Weird

3.40
3.93

2.20
2.19

2.30
2.20

1.22
1.44

Worthless*

4,83

1.72

4.88

L96_

Note. * = Words added (HSA ? = 6; LSA ? = 8); HSA = High
Social Anxiety; LSA = Low Social Anxiety
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Tableó

Anxiety Ratingsfor Control Wordsfor Study 1 (N = 35)
HSA
? = 15

__________________M

LSA
? = 20

SD

M

SD

Apple

1.33

0.62

1.15

0.49

Beans

1.13

0.52

1.15

0.37

Blackberry
Cabbage

1.07
1.13

0.26
0.35

1.30
1.40

0.57
0.88

Carrots
Cauliflower

1.13
1.07

0.35
0.26

1.25
1.40

0.72
0.99

Celery

1.00

0.00

1.30

0.80

Coconut
Corn
Cranberries

1.00
1.00
1.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.15
1.30
1.15

0.67
1.13
0.49

Fig

1.07

0.26

1.30

0.92

Fruit

1.20

0.77

1.20

0.70

Grapes

1.07

0.26

1.15

0.49

Lemon
Lettuce
Lime

1.00
1.00
1.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.15
1.20
1.20

0.49
0.70
0.62

Melon
Mushrooms

1.00
1.27

0.00
0.80

1.50
1.30

1.28
0.86

Orange
Parsley

1.00
1.00

0.00
0.00

1.10
1.40

0.31
1.10

Pea
Peaches
Pear

1.00
1.00
1.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.15
1.10
1.25

0.67
0.31
0.64

Pepper
Pineapple
Pumpkin

1.07
1.07
1.00

0.26
0.26
0.00

1.15
1.20
1.25

0.49
0.52
0.79

Radishes

1.07

0.26

1.35

0.93

Raisins

1.00

0.00

1.45

1.23

Spinach
Strawberry

3.67
1.00

2.16
0.00

1.35
1.25

1.18
0.79

Tomatoes

1.00

0.00

1.35

0.99

Vegetables
L07
0.26
1.55
1.50
Note. HSA = High Social Anxiety; LSA = Low Social Anxiety
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Threat and Control Word Ratings Across Lags 2, 3, and 8
To ensure that words were found to be equally anxiety provoking across the lags
that were examined in the current study, a 2 Anxiety (high vs. low) by 3 Lag (2, 3,8)
ANOVA was conducted for both threat and control words. For threat words, a main

effect was found for Lag (F p, 66) = 10.22, ? < .001), with simple effects tests revealing
that threat words at lags 2 (M = 3.41, SD = 1.49) and 8 (M = 3.37, SD = 1.52) were
significantly more anxiety provoking compared to threat words at lag 3 (M = 3.07, SD =
1.42). There was no difference between anxiety ratings for threat words at lag 2
compared to threat words at lag 8. An interaction between social anxiety group and lag

was also found for threat word ratings (F c¿, 66) = 4.84,/) < .01). Simple effect tests
revealed that for participants high in social anxiety, ratings for threat words at lags 2 (M=
4.24, SD = 1.40) and 8 (M= 4.08, SD = 1.42) were rated as significantly more anxiety
provoking compared to threat words at lag 3 (M= 3.58, SD = 1.52). No difference was
found amongst anxiety provoking ratings for threat words at lags 2, 3, and 8 for

participants low in social anxiety. See Figure 8.
A 2 Anxiety (high vs. low) by 3 Lag (2, 3, 8) ANOVA was also conducted to
determine if the control words differed in anxiety provoking ratings across the lags. No

significant differences emerged - participants did not differ in how anxiety provoking
they found the control words to be at lags 2, 3, or 8.

Overall Accuracy on AB for the Experimental Condition
For the experimental condition, participants were presented with neutral red font
stimuli (Tl) and a green font word (either a social threat word, or fruit vegetable word;
T2). Participants were instructed to pay attention to both the red and green words, and to
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Figure 8.

Anxiety Ratings for Threat Words Across the Lags for Participants High vs Low in
Social Anxiety
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identify them both at the end of each trial. Overall, the accuracy rate for correct
identification of T2 across all lags was within expected ranges for both threat (M = 65.49,
SD = 15.59) and control (M = 74.25, SD = 13.72) words.
Overall Accuracy on the AB for the Control Condition
For the control block condition, participants saw the same stimuli as in the

experimental condition; however participants were instructed to only pay attention to the
green word (T2). Thus, participants were instructed to ignore the red word (Tl), and only
pay attention to identifying the green word at the end of each task. To determine if there
were any attentional impairments in identifying stimuli, a 2 social anxiety group (high,
low) ? 2 word (threat, control) ANOVA was performed. A significant main effect of
word was found (F (1, 33) = 23.30,/? < .001), with control words having significantly

higher accuracy identification rates (M= 91.25, SD = 9.39) compared to threat words (M
= 84.77, SD = 12.38). Social anxiety was not found to have any impact on identification
of words.

Overall, participants had a higher accuracy identification rate for both threat and
control words in this control block compared to the experimental block. This was

expected given that the control condition is a single task, compared to the more
cognitively demanding dual task in the experimental condition.
Hypotheses

Effect of social anxiety on the AB. It was hypothesized that participants with high levels

of social anxiety would show an attenuated AB when a threat related word was placed as
a second target in a RSVP paradigm compared to when T2 was a control word, and
participants low in social anxiety. To assess this, a 2 (condition) ? 3 (lag) ? 2 (word type)
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ANOVA was conducted. Depression has also been found to influence the attentional bias

in social anxiety. Musa et al. (2003) found that social phobic patients with comorobid
depression showed an avoidance of social threat words. When Musa and colleagues
removed these patients from their analyses a hypervigilance specific for social threat
words emerged. Given the findings that depression can alter the attentional bias in social
phobia, it was used as a covariate. The BDI was used as a covariate and was not found to
be significant, and thus, was eliminated for subsequent analyses. Anxiety level ratings
across the lags was also used as a covariate, given that analyses revealed participants
found threat words at lags 2 and 8 to be significantly more anxiety provoking compared
to threat words at lag 3. Anxiety level ratings were not found to be significant covariates,
and thus were not used for subsequent analyses. Descriptive statistics for these variables

are presented in Table 7, and are graphed in Figure 9. The hypothesized three-way
interaction among condition, lag, and word type was not significant. Main effects were
found for lag (F (2, 66) = 36.80, ? < .001), and word type (F (1, 33) = 30.20, ? < .001). The
main effect for word type revealed that threat words (M= 65.49, SD = 15.59) had
significantly lower accuracy scores compared to control words (M= 74.25, SD = 13.72),
overall. An interaction between lag and word was also found (F (2, 66) = 7.22, ? < .05).
Simple effects tests on lag position revealed that all of the lags significantly differed from
each other. Lag 2 had significantly lower accuracy compared to accuracy at lag 3 (t (34) =
-6.40,/? <.001), and at lag 8 (t (34) = -8.33,/? < .001). Lag 3 also had significantly lower
accuracy compared to accuracy at lag 8 (t (34) = -2.27, ? = .03). See Table 8 for
descriptive statistics.
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Table 7

Mean Accuracy Scoresfor HSA and LSA Participantsfor Threat and Control Words at

the Different Lagsfor Study 1 (N = 35)
M_

HSA
? = 15

SD

M

LSA
? = 20

SD

Threat at Lag 2

50.40

24.61

48.45

20.08

Control at Lag 2

43.80

23.41

54.45

25.65

Threat at Lag 3

54.20

22.40

66.65

23.78

Control at Lag 3

67.53

19.73

73.60

20.37

Threat at Lag 8

60.20

25.95

61.45

22.89

Control at Lag 8

81.00

21.60

85.15

22.34

Note. HSA = High Social Anxiety; LSA = Low Social Anxiety

67

Figure 9.

Condition by Lag by Word Type Interaction for the Experimental Block in Study 1
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Table 8

Mean Accuracy Scores Across the Different Lags for Study 1 (N = 35)
M

SD

Lag 2

49.59a

20.99

Lag 3

65.87b

17.67

Lag 8

72.14c

19.89

Note. Means with differing subscripts are significantly different at the ? < .001 level
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Simple effect tests on the lag by word interaction revealed that there were

significant differences for accuracy between threat versus control words at lags 3 (t ^4) =
- 2.35, ? = .03) and 8 (t (34) = - 8.06, ? < .001), with control words having a significantly
higher accuracy identification rate compared to threat words. There was no significant
difference between the accuracy identification of threat versus control words at lag 2, (t

(34) = - .?, ? — .87). See Table 9 for descriptive statistics and Figure 10.
Discussion

The purpose of the first study was threefold: first, to examine the effects that
socially threatening words have on participants with high or low levels of social anxiety
in the AB paradigm; second, to confirm the presence of the AB period; and third, to
examine which social threat words participants high in anxiety found to be the most
anxiety provoking.
Previous research has found that in an RSVP stream, when T2 is of high
relevance to the individual (e.g., their own name), they will show an attenuated AB
(Shapiro et al., 1997). Furthermore, emotionally arousing stimuli, such as negative or

threatening words, have also been found to cause an attenuated AB (Anderson, 2005;
Keil & Ihssen, 2004). Additionally, research on social anxiety and the AB has found
support for a hypervigilance towards threat stimuli (Arend & Botella, 2002). Thus, given
the previous research on the AB, it was hypothesized that participants with high levels of

social anxiety would show an attenuated AB for threat related words compared to control
words, and compared to those low in social anxiety. Contrary to what was hypothesized,
participants that were high in social anxiety did not show an attenuated AB for threat

related words compared to control words, and compared to those low in social anxiety.
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Table 9

Mean Accuracy Scoresfor Correct T2 Identification for Threat and Control Words
Across the Different Lags for Study 1(N = 35)
Lag 2
Lag 3
Lag 8

_______________

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Threat Words

49.29

21.81

60.74

23.58

60.91

23.89

Control Words

49.89

24.94

71.00

20.04

83.37

21.80

'
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Figure 10.

Lag by Word Type Interaction for the Correct Identification of T2 for the Experimental
Condition of Study 1
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Within the framework of attentional biases in social anxiety literature, these results do not
appear to be explained by any of the theories of attentional biases, such as hypervigilance
or attentional avoidance. Based on this finding, these results do not support a

hypervigilance towards threat for high social anxiety participants. If a bias towards threat
related words was present, then an attenuated AB for threat words would have been
found, but only for socially anxious participants. This finding also goes against previous
research done on social anxiety and the AB. Arend and Botella (2002) found an
attenuated AB for high trait socially anxious individuals for threat words, compared to

neutral words and those low in trait social anxiety. In their study, when Tl was a threat
word, participants high in trait social anxiety had an increased accurate identification rate
for T2 words compared to neutral words, and those low in trait social anxiety. Thus, it is

possible that one reason why the hypothesized results were not found in the present study
is due to having the threat words presented as T2, as opposed to being presented at Tl as
in Arend and Botella's study. It is possible that target order where the threat stimuli are
placed influences whether a hypervigilance bias will be found. It is possible that having a
social threat word as Tl leads socially anxious individuals to pay more attention to

subsequent items in an RSVP stream because of a hypervigilance towards threat. It is also
possible that having a threat word as Tl requires less cognitive processing resources for
the social phobic. Thus, in terms of the bottleneck model of the AB proposed by Chun
and Potter (1995), the saliency of the threat word for social phobies may require less
cognitive processing time, which would then eliminate the metaphorical bottleneck at
which T2 is stuck at while consolidation of Tl occurs. IfTl has a faster consolidation

73

rate because of the saliency, then T2 does not have as long to wait in the 'bottleneck', and
is subsequently less vulnerable to decay.
In terms of attentional biases in social anxiety, it is possible that once a socially
anxious person perceives a threatening stimulus in their environment, they are more
attentive to information in their environment regardless of whether that information is

threatening or neutral. However, the length of time that a social phobic remains
hypervigilant towards information in their environment remains to be determined. It is
possible that this hypervigilance only lasts for a small epoch of time, particularly if
another threat in the environment is not detected.

A second unexpected finding was that there were significant differences in correct

responses to the word type, although not in the hypothesized direction. It was
hypothesized that overall, participants would have a higher identification rate for threat
words compared to control words, because threat words are emotionally arousing, and

previous research has found that emotionally arousing stimuli are preferentially selected
from the temporal stream (Anderson, 2005). However, control words had a significantly
higher accuracy identification rate in the experimental block compared to threat related

words. One potential reason for this may be due to priming. Tl was always a neutral
word, and it is possible that the activation of a neutral word primed participants for
subsequent neutral words, such as fruit/vegetable words. In support of this notion, Maki
et al. (1997) found improved accuracy identification rates for T2 when Tl was strongly
associated to T2, suggesting that priming had an effect. However, in regards to the

current study, it is unclear how strongly Tl and T2 controls are related. The only
semantic category that both word groups would fall under is 'neutral words', and such a
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broad categorical grouping may be a bit tenuous to assume priming of Tl produced
improved accuracy results for control words.
As an alternative explanation, it is possible that words that are concrete objects
require less cognitive processing because they can be visually represented in the mind,
and this visual representation is what aids in accuracy identification rates. For example, it

is possible that in an RSVP stream, a control word like "Apple" may require less
. cognitive processing time (i.e., faster processing speeds), and subsequently have higher
accuracy identifications rates compared to a non-object, and more abstract concept, such
as a threat word like "Loser". Based on this hypothesis, it is then possible that the reason

why participants overall had a higher accuracy for the control words is because they are

C

concrete objects, compared to threat words that are abstract concepts.
The second objective of this study was to establish the AB period by having both
an experimental and control condition. Because little research has been done on social

anxiety and the AB, we thought it was prudent to include a control condition to compare
to the experimental on the AB. Consistent with our hypothesis, and previous literature,
participants had higher accuracy identification levels for T2 for the control condition
compared to the experimental condition. This is consistent with previous AB research
(e.g., Raymond et al., 1992) and makes theoretical sense given that in the control
condition participants only had to engage in a single task identification compared to the
dual-task identification in the experimental condition. Interesting to note, is that

participants still had a significantly higher accuracy identification rate for control words,
compared to threat words in the control block. This may provide support for the notion
that concrete objects are more easily recalled compared to abstract concepts.
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The third objective of this study was to ensure that the social threat words that
were used as stimuli were found to be more anxiety provoking for the high socially

anxious participants compared to the low socially anxious participants. Consistent with
the hypothesis, it was found that participants who were high in social anxiety rated social
threat words to be significantly more anxiety provoking compared to control words, and
compared to participants low in social anxiety. This was important because it provided
validation that the social threat stimuli were found to be threatening, particularly for
participants with high levels of social anxiety.
The word ratings also had a second purpose - to determine which threat words
were found to be the most threatening to socially anxious participants to use as stimuli in

Study 2. Thus, threat words that were found to have an anxiety level rating of 3 or below
were eliminated as threat stimuli for Study 2.
Limitations

One limitation of the current study was the social anxiety screening measure that

was used. Although previous research has found the psychometric properties of the MiniSPFN to be adequate (Weeks et al., 2007), the psychometric properties have only been
assessed on clinical populations of social phobies, and not non-clinical undergraduate

samples as was used in the present study. The fact that several participants switched
conditions (e.g., the Mini-SPIN identified them as low in social anxiety, but their social
anxiety in-lab scores revealed them to be highly socially anxious) may suggest that this
measure is not as appropriate for the screening of social anxiety in a non-clinical
population, compared to a clinical population. A better method to deal with screening
issues would be to only include participants who met criteria on both the prescreen and in
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lab measures of social anxiety. However, this approach was not feasible given the low
sample size. Another limitation related to the Mini-SPIN was that only the total score on
the Mini-SPIN was recorded during recruitment. Individual answers for each of the three
questions were not recorded. Thus, Cronbach's alpha could not be assessed, which would
have been useful in determining the reliability of the Mini-SPIN in the current sample
A second limitation was some of the words that were used at lags 6 and 8. These
words had consistent low accuracy scores across anxiety conditions, and were commonly
misinterpreted as other similarly spelt words (e.g., the threat word 'uptight' was

commonly misinterpreted as 'upright'). Thus, these words reduced the accuracy at lag 8
for all participants, making the identification rates of T2 at these lags to be lower than
what would have been expected. Thus, these commonly misinterpreted words were
eliminated as target words for Study 2.

A third limitation of this study was that there were differences across the lags in
terms of anxiety provoking ratings for threat words. All word stimuli were randomly
distributed across the lags, therefore it was merely by chance that threat words that were
found to be less anxiety provoking ended up at lag 3. However, this limitation did not

appear to have any impact on the assessment of the AB, given that anxiety provoking
ratings did not influence the magnitude of the AB. Unfortunately, the examination of
anxiety levels across the lags was not run prior to the data collection for Study 2.
However, two of the words that happened to be in Lag 3 ('boring', and 'dull') received
low anxiety level ratings, and thus were replaced for Study 2.
Despite the fact that the results were not in the hypothesized direction for Study 1 ,
for Study 2 it was still hypothesized that rumination may have some impact on the
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attentional bias. Specifically, it was hypothesized that rumination would lead a socially
anxious individual to have a hypervigilance towards threat related words in the
environment. Thus, Study 2 sought to examine the potential relation between rumination
and attentional biases in those with high, and low, levels of social anxiety.
Study #2: The Effect of Rumination on the Attentional Blink
The purpose of study 2 was to investigate the effects of rumination on attentional
biases in those with high and low levels of social anxiety in an attentional blink

paradigm. Specifically, the study examined whether or not rumination led to a more
heightened awareness of threat related stimuli in those with high levels of social anxiety.
Three main hypotheses were tested. First, it was hypothesized that participants high in
social anxiety would have higher levels of distress resulting from the impromptu speech
task compared to those low in social anxiety. Second, it was hypothesized that

participants high in social anxiety would ruminate more than participants low in social
anxiety, and that those high in social anxiety and in the rumination condition would
ruminate the most. Third, it was hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety and
in the rumination condition would show an attenuated AB when T2 was a social threat

word, compared to participants high in social anxiety and in the distraction condition, and
compared to participants low in social anxiety in either the rumination or distraction
condition.
Method

Participants

Undergraduate students at WLU were recruited for this study based on their
online SIAS mass testing scores through WLU' s Psychology Research Experience
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Program (PREP). Out of all of the participants who completed the mass testing SIAS
questionnaire, participants that scored in the top-third, and bottom-third on the SIAS were

eligible to participate in the current study, provided they had not participated in Study 1 .
Based on a sample of 589 participants in mass testing, the cutoff score on the SIAS for
the high social anxiety group was 3 1 and above, and the cutoff score on the SIAS for the
low social anxiety group was 1 8 and below. Participants who met either of these

prescreening requirements were invited into the lab to participate in the study. Eighty-one
participants completed the in lab study, however, data from 1 5 people were excluded
from analyses because their in lab scores on the SIAS either fell below a score of 31, or
above a score of 18. Thus, to be included in the analyses participants had to meet a score

for high, or low, social anxiety consistently at both testing times. The following analyses
are based on a sample of 66 participants - 32 high in social anxiety, and 34 low in social
anxiety.

Upon entering the lab, participants were randomly assigned to either a rumination
or distraction manipulation condition by the researcher drawing a slip of paper out of an

envelope. Participants' ages ranged from 17 to 39, and the majority of participants
reported their ethnicity as Caucasian. See Table 10 for demographic information. As
compensation for participating in the study, participants received one credit towards their
course.

Baseline Measures

Demographic questionnaire. A demographic questionnaire was administered to
participants, and asked them to provide information about their age, highest level of
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education, current living situation, marital and occupational status and ethnicity in a
closed-ended format (see Appendix C).
Social anxiety. Social anxiety was assessed using the SPS and the SIAS (see
Appendices D and E respectively); these measures were described in detail in Study 1 .
Depression. Depression was assessed using the BDI (see Appendix F). For
details on this measure, please see the description of the BDI in Study 1.
RSVP stimuli. The RSVP task was programmed using the same software and

design as described in Study 1, where neutral words were presented in red font as Tl, and
probe words (either social threat or control words) were presented in green font as T2. A
total of 12 stimuli words (5 T2 social threat words, 2 T2 control words, and 5 neutral Tl

words) were replaced for Study 2 if the word was commonly misidentified, or if the word
had a low anxiety rating in Study 1 . As previously mentioned, threat words were replaced
if they met at least one of the following criteria: (1) consistent low identification rate

among all participants; (2) low anxiety word rating among high social anxiety
participants. T2 control words, and Tl neutral words were replaced if they were
commonly misidentified by participants (e.g., 'registrar' was commonly mistaken for

'register'), or if the length/frequency of the T2 threat word it was matched with changed.
Procedure

A procedural diagram outlining the main steps for Study 2 is presented in Figure
1 1 . Participants who scored in the upper and bottom-thirds on mass testing were invited
to participate in the current study, and were run individually with one experimenter in the
laboratory with them. Upon arrival at the lab, participants first completed the informed
consent (see Appendix I), which outlined the important aspects of the current study, and

Figure 11.
Procedural Diagram for Study 2.

Mass Testing
Questionnaires
Demographics
SIAS
SPS
BDI

Speech
"Why would you make a
good employee?"
JL
SUDs Ratings

/—

Feedback
1.) Eye Contact
2.) Content of Argument
3.) Body Language
4.) Articulation
5.) Appearance
6.) Overall Evaluation

\

V

Rumination Task
Counterfactual Thoughts

Distraction Task
Visualization Task

G

?

Rumination Manipulation
Check
RSVP Task

T
Believability Measure
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were then given a questionnaire package, which included the demographic questionnaire,
the SPS, the SIAS, and the BDI.

Speech task and feedback. After completion of the questionnaire packages

participants were asked to give their subjective unit of distress (SUDs) rating, which
measured anxiety/distress levels on a visual scale ranging from 0 to 100 (see Appendix
P). Participants were then instructed to give a 5 minute impromptu speech in front of the
research assistant on reasons why they would make a good employee. Participants were
given the following instructions:
You will now give a short speech. Please stand on the square on the floor
while you speak. I would like you to talk for a full 5 minutes. If you run

out of things to say, feel free to repeat things you've already said. It is
important that you continue to talk for the full 5 minutes. The topic is
"why would you make a good employee", and I would like you to come
up with as many reasons as possible.

Participants were then immediately asked to stand and deliver their speech to the
experimenter. Immediately following the speech task, participants were asked again to
give their SUDs rating for the level of anxiety/distress they experienced giving the
speech, during the speech, and after the speech was over. The experimenter then provided
participants with standardized negative feedback (see Appendix K). The standardized
feedback was modified based on the standardized feedback given by Morgan and

Banerjee (2008) to socially anxious participants following an impromptu speech task.
There were six categories on the speech feedback form: eye contact, content of argument,
body language, articulation, appearance, and overall evaluation. Every participant
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received the same feedback despite the quality of the speech they gave. Upon receiving
their feedback, participants were asked to review it for 5 minutes. Next, participants were

given either a distraction or rumination task to complete for the following 10 minutes (see
Appendices L and M, respectively).
Distraction condition. Participants assigned to the distraction condition engaged
in the same distraction manipulation done by Morrison and O'Connor (2008), which was

initially developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993). During this task participants
were instructed to visualize and concentrate on a series of 45 items in a 10 minute period.

The objects that participants visualized and concentrated on were externally focused
away from the self, symptoms, and emotions. An example of an object would be: "Think
about: raindrops sliding down a window pane".

Rumination condition. Participants assigned to the rumination condition were
asked to list any concerns they had prior, during, or after the speech. They were also
asked questions that had them focusing on counterfactual thoughts, as previous research
has shown that socially anxious individuals report more counterfactual thoughts

following socially distressing events compared to less anxious individuals (Kocovski et
al., 2005).

Rumination manipulation check. Following the distraction or rumination
condition participants were given a 5-item Rumination Questionnaire (RQ; Mellings &
Alden, 2000; see Appendix N) that assessed the degree to which they had ruminated on
the negative feedback given to them on the speech task. Cronbach's alpha was found to
be .70 for the total score on this measure (Mellings & Alden, 2000). On this rumination
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measure participants were asked to rate how accurately the statement reflected their
experience on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never true) to 5 (very often).
RSVP task. After the rumination questionnaire participants completed the RSVP

task. For a list of target and probe words used in the RSVP task, see Figure 12. This
RSVP task followed a similar procedure that was described in Study 1, with the

exception of participants completing the control condition. Thus, participants were only
run on the experimental RSVP condition, which asked them to report both the red and
green words they saw. Following the RSVP task, participants were asked to fill out a
believability measure (Appendix O), in order to assess how believable they found the
standardized feedback that was given to them.
Believability measure. Following the RSVP task, participants were asked to fill
out a believability measure (Appendix O), in order to assess how believable they found

the standardized feedback that was given to them. Participants were instructed to rate on
a 5-point Likert, scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), on the
extent to which they agreed with the researcher's opinion of them on the following
categories: eye contact; content of argument; body language; articulation; appearance;
overall performance score.

Impression of researcher measure. Participants then filled out an end of study
questionnaire (Appendix Q) that assessed the overall impression participants had of the
researcher. Participants were asked to indicate the extent that they agreed with the
statements of 6 items (e.g., "The researcher gave me the impression that he/she did not
like me") on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree).
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Figure 12.

Word Pairings of RSVP Stimuli for Study 2
Target Words

Probe
Threat

Words
Control

pumpkin
parsley
peaches
tangerine
strawberry

address

collect

anxious

journal

bargain
laundry

ashamed

adventure
dressmaker

worthless

television

registrar

fragrance
comedian

disgraced
unworthy

mushrooms

nearness

test

curb

lime

maintenance

grandfather

dumb
embarrassed

quarter

shelter

contact

garment

population
researching

economical
consolidate

think
vacation
videos
confirm
media
determine

towel

incompetent cauliflower
inept
apple

umbrella

inferior

radishes

thread

judged
jittery

grapes

loser
mortified

melon

created
sidewalks

lottery
infer

awkward
criticized

failure
foolish

humiliated

honeydew
cranberries
lettuce

cabbage
vegetables

coconut

program

advertise
leather

sun

pot

odd

pea

swimming
relay

decorate

rejected

tomatoes

eagle

idiot

lemon

cat

shy
inadequate
stupid

fig
blackberry

imagine

fox
translator
dealer
dresser

stutter

carrots

sweet

cloud

tense

fruit

finish

remedy

uneasy

celery

options

florist

disgust

raisins

news

golf

event

seize

weak
weird

beans

everything
intern

nervous

pineapple
spinach

pepper

corn

Note. Words that are denoted with a bold typeface were the modified words added for
Study 2
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Debriefing. At the end of the study participants were given a debriefing form (see
Appendix R), as well as given process debriefing. Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975)
discovered that participants that were given erroneous feedback and given a debriefing
form stating the feedback was predetermined still evaluated their performance and

abilities as negative. Ross and colleagues noticed that this perseverance survived the
debriefing period even when participants explicitly stated that they understood the
feedback was false. However, when participants underwent process debriefing,

perseverance was eliminated. Ross and colleagues explain that process debriefing is
where the researcher discusses the possibility with participants that negative beliefs about
the self due to the erroneous feedback can still survive despite knowing that the feedback
was false. Thus, due to these findings by Ross and colleagues, for this second study,

participants all underwent process debriefing facilitated by the researcher.
Data Analysis

Manipulation checks were performed on rumination, believability of speech
feedback, and impression of researcher. Three main hypotheses were also tested. First, it
was hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety would have higher levels of
distress resulting from the impromptu speech task compared to those low in social
anxiety. To assess if there were any differences amongst the groups on levels of distress,
a repeated measures 2 Anxiety (high vs. low socially anxious) X 3 SUDs Timing (first vs.
second vs. third SUDs ratings) X 2 Manipulation (distraction vs. rumination) ANOVA
was performed. Second, it was hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety
would ruminate more than participants low in social anxiety, and that those high in social
anxiety and in the rumination condition would ruminate the most. To assess the degree of
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rumination between the anxiety groups and manipulation conditions, a 2 Anxiety (high

vs. low socially anxious) ? 2 Manipulation (rumination vs. distraction). A rumination
score was assessed based on the average a participant scored on the RQ. Last, it was
hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety and in the rumination condition
would show an attenuated AB for threat related words, compared to those in the
distraction task, and those low in social anxiety. To assess this, a repeated measures 2
Word (threat vs. control) X 3 Lag (2 vs. 3 vs. 8) X 2 Anxiety (high vs. low socially
anxious) X 2 Manipulation (distraction vs. rumination) ANOVA was performed.
Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 1 provides a summary of the means and standard deviations for the
measures of social anxiety and depression across the high and low social anxiety
conditions, as well as the rumination and distraction conditions. A 2 (social anxiety) ? 2

(manipulation condition) between subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine if
participants differed on social anxiety and depression measures in the rumination versus
distraction conditions. Participants high in social anxiety in the rumination group did not
differ on measures of social anxiety or depression from those high in social anxiety in the

distraction group. Similarly, participants low in social anxiety in the rumination group did
not differ on social anxiety or depression measures from those low in social anxiety and

in the distraction group. However, the high social anxiety group had significantly higher

scores on the SIAS (F (h62) = 358. 17, ? < .001), SPS (F (lfi2) = 80.70", /> < .001), and BDI
(F (i,62) = 18.1 1, ? < .001) compared to participants in the low social anxiety group.
Taken together these findings provide support that the high social anxiety group was
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Table 1 1

Social Anxiety and Depression Measures for Social Anxiety Group by Manipulation

Conditionfor Study 2 (N ~ 66)
HSA

LSA

Rumination

Distraction

Rumination

Distraction

µ = 15

« = 17

? = 19

«=15

________________M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

SIAS

45.13

10.43

47.91

9.05

11.17

4.05

10.53

4.89

SPS

32.87

17.15

34.39

12.89

9.37

4.95

8.40

6.93

BDI

16.67

10.13

17.00

7.07

9.11

5.29

9.13

6.48

Note. HSA = High Social Anxiety; LSA = Low Social Anxiety; SIAS = Social
Interaction Anxiety Scale; SPS = Social Phobia Scale; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory
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significantly higher in levels of social anxiety and depression compared to the low social
anxiety group. Furthermore, these findings provide support that random assignment
within the social anxiety groups to either the rumination or distraction conditions was
successful.

Manipulation Checks
Believability. Measures of believability were assessed out of the concern that
participants high in social anxiety would be more likely to believe the negative feedback
compared to participants low in social anxiety. Thus, believability of speech feedback
was assessed to ensure that any differences that may be found between the social anxiety
conditions would be due to the level of social anxiety, and not as a result of believability.
To assess if there were any differences in believability on speech feedback
between the social anxiety groups, and manipulation conditions, an average of the
believability measure for each category (eye contact, content of argument, body
language, articulation, appearance, and overall performance score) was taken, and a 2
Anxiety (high vs. low) ? 2 Manipulation (rumination vs. distraction) was conducted. A

main effect of social anxiety was found (F(i;6i)~ 13.20,/? < .001), with simple effects
tests revealing that participants high in social anxiety rated the speech feedback to be
more believable (M = 3.99, SD = .53) than participants low in social anxiety (M = 3.52,

SD = .93), t (62) = 2.45, ? < .05. A main effect was also found for manipulation condition
(F (i, 6i) = 5.85, ? < .05), with simple effects tests revealing that there was a trend for
participants in the rumination condition to rate the speech feedback as more believable
(M= 3.87, SD = .74) than participants in the distraction condition (M= 3.61, SD = .84), t

(62) = 1.32,/? = .19. A significant interaction between social anxiety group and
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manipulation condition was also found (F (i; 6i> = 4.39,/» < .05), see Figure 13. Simple
effects reveal that participants low in social anxiety and in the rumination condition
believed the feedback (M = 3.78, SD = 1.11) significantly more than participants low in

social anxiety and in the distraction condition (M = 2.73, SD = 1.10), t pi) = 2.01,/» < .05.
However, no significant difference was found between believability ratings for
participants high in social anxiety and in the rumination condition (M= 4.13, SD = .64)
compared to the distraction condition (M = 4.06, SD = .75).
Impression of researcher. The impressions that participants had of the
researcher were assessed to determine if the researcher behaved consistently towards all

participants. Items C, E, and F were reverse coded, and the average of the 6 items was
assessed. A 2 (social anxiety) ? 2 (manipulation condition) ANOVA was conducted to

determine if participants differed in their overall impressions of the researcher across
social anxiety groups and manipulation conditions. A trend for social anxiety condition
was found (F (1,62) = 3.3 1, ? = .07), with participants high in social anxiety having a
slightly less favourable opinion of the researcher (M= 4.19, SD = .09) compared to
participants low in social anxiety (M= 4.42, SD - .09).
Hypotheses

1. Distress levels. It was hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety
would have higher levels of distress resulting from the impromptu speech task compared
to those low in social anxiety. To assess if there were any differences amongst the groups
on levels of distress, a repeated measures 2 Anxiety (high vs. low socially anxious) X 3
SUDs Time (first vs. second vs. third SUDs ratings) X 2 Manipulation (distraction vs.
rumination) ANOVA was performed. A main effect of timing was found for distress (F q.,
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Figure 13.
Social Anxiety Level by Manipulation Condition on Speech Feedback Believability
Ratings

=
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Rumination

Distraction
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124) = 39.52, ? < .001), with simple effect tests revealing a significant peak in distress
during the speech compared to distress levels before (t (65) = 6.82,/» < .001) and after (t
(65) = 8.39, ? < .001) the task. Participants did not differ significantly on their levels of
distress before compared to after the speech task. See Table 12.

A main effect was also found for social anxiety (F (i;62) = 38.35,/? < .001), with
participants high in social anxiety reporting significantly more distress overall (M =
54.12, SD = 3.04) compared to those low in social anxiety (M = 27.85, SD = 2.96).
A significant 3-way interaction among distress, social anxiety level, and

manipulation was found (see Figure 14). Simple effect tests revealed that participants
high in social anxiety, and in the rumination condition, experienced significantly greater
levels of distress prior to the speech task compared to participants high in social anxiety

and in the distraction condition (t (30)= 2.15, ? < .05). Simple effects also revealed that
participants low in social anxiety, and in the distraction group experienced significantly
higher levels of distress before the speech, compared to participants low in social anxiety
in the rumination condition (t (32) = 2.97, ? < .05). Taken together, these findings suggest
that random assignment into the different manipulation conditions (rumination vs.

distraction) did not work in terms of levels of distress, as participants significantly
differed on their measures of distress prior to receiving the rumination or distraction
manipulation.
2. Rumination. Rumination was measured using the 5-item RQ measure where

participants were asked to rate how accurately the statement reflected their experience on
a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never true) to 5 (very often). Cronbach's alpha on
the RQ for the current sample was excellent, with a score of .92. In order to assess if the
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Table 12

Mean SUDs Scoresfor Before, During, and After the Impromptu Speech Taskfor Study

2 (N =66)
M
SD

Before Speech
34.27a ~~
3.11

~

During Speech
59.05b

After Speech
29.64a

2.83

2.91

Note. Means with differing subscripts are significantly different at ? < .001
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Figure 14.

Social Anxiety Level by Manipulation Condition on SUDs as Rated Before, During, and
After the Impromptu Speech
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rumination manipulation was successful and if social anxiety group had any impact on
rumination, a 2 Anxiety (high vs. low) ? 2 Manipulation (rumination vs. distraction)
ANOVA was conducted. Given that previous research has found that participants high in
social anxiety ruminate more than participants low in social anxiety (Edwards et al.,
2003), it was hypothesized that overall, participants who were high in social anxiety
would ruminate more than participants low in social anxiety, regardless of their

manipulation (rumination vs. distraction) condition. Main effects were found for anxiety
group (F(i;62) = 7.91,/? < .01), and manipulation condition (F (i ,62)= 54.85,/» < .001).
Simple effects tests for the main effect of anxiety group found that there was a slight

trend (t (64) = 1.61,/? = .1 1) for participants high in.social anxiety to ruminate more (M =
2.46, SD = 1.23) than participants low in social anxiety (M = 1.99, SD = 1.13). However,

when participants high in social anxiety in the rumination condition were compared to
participants low in social anxiety in the rumination condition on the measure of

rumination, a significant difference emerged (t ^) = 3.09,/? < .05). Participants high in
social anxiety in the rumination condition had significantly higher rumination scores (M

= 3.37, SD = .59) compared to participants low in social anxiety in the rumination
condition (M= 2.64, SD = .75). Simple effects tests for the main effect of manipulation

condition revealed that participants in the rumination condition (M= 2.96, SD = 0.77)
reported significantly higher rumination levels (t (64) = 6.84,/? < .001) compared to
participants in the distraction condition (M= 1.42, SD = 1.05). This finding suggests that
the rumination manipulation was successful, given that participants in the rumination
condition reported significantly higher levels of dwelling on negative aspects of their
speech performance compared to participants in the distraction condition.
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3. Attenuated AB for threat words for HSA rumination condition

participants. It was hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety and in the
rumination condition would show an attenuated AB for threat related words, compared to
those in the distraction task, and those low in social anxiety. To assess this, a repeated
measures 2 Word (threat vs. control) X 3 Lag (2 vs. 3 vs. 8) X 2 Anxiety (high vs. low
socially anxious) X 2 Manipulation (distraction vs. rumination) ANOVA was performed.
See Table 13. The BDI was used as a covariate and was not found to be significant, and
thus, was eliminated for subsequent analyses. Further, given that previous analyses found
significant differences in levels of distress prior to giving the impromptu speech, SUDs
levels prior to giving the speech were also used as a covariate. However, this variable
was also not found to be significant, and was eliminated for subsequent analyses.

Main effects were found for word (F (i; 62) = 47.26, ? < .001), and lag position (F
(2, 124) = 160.21,/) < .001). Interactions between word and lag (F (2,124) = 23.92,/? < .001),
and word by social anxiety condition (F (1,124) = 5.61,/» < .05) were also found.
The main effect of word (t (65) = 6.85,/?<.001) revealed a higher accuracy rate for
control words (M = 52.30, SD = 20.99) compared to threat words (M = 42.1 1, SD =

22.83). Simple effects tests for the main effect for lag revealed that lag 2 had significantly
lower accuracy compared to lags 3 (t (65) = -4.87,/» < .001 ) and 8 (t (65) = -14.76,/? < .001
), and that lag 3 had significantly lower accuracy compared to lag 8 (t (65) = -15.17,/? <
.001).
Simple effects tests on the word by lag interaction revealed that threat words at
lag 3 (M= 32.74, SD = 23.34) had significantly lower accuracy compared to control
words at lag 3 (M= 50.01, SD = 26.06), / {65)=-6A4,p < .001. Similarly, threat words at
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lag 8 (M= 60.82, SD = 24.96) had significantly lower accuracy compared to control
words at lag 8 (M = 79.00, SD = 22.66), t (65) = -6.57,/? < .001. There was also a trend for
threat words at lag 2 to have a higher accuracy compared to control words at lag 2 (t (65) =
1.71, /7 = .09). See Figure 15.
Simple effects tests on the word by social anxiety condition interaction revealed

that there were no significant differences for threat word accuracy (t (64) = .21, ? = .83)
between participants high in social anxiety (M= 42.93, SD = 21.86), and participants low

in social anxiety (M= 41.74, SD = 24.02). Similarly, there were no significant
differences for control control words (t (64) = -1 .14, ? = .26) between participants high in
social anxiety (M= 49.77, SD = 19.62) and participants low in social anxiety (M= 55.65,
SD = 22.12). However, what appears to be driving this interaction is a modest impairment
for the low socially anxious participants to accurately identify threat words in comparison
to control words. In comparison, participants high in social anxiety do not seem to suffer
as much impairment in accurately identifying threat words in relation to control words.
See Figure 16.
Discussion

Overall, the purpose of this second study was to examine the effect that
rumination might have on the attentional bias in those with high or low levels of social
anxiety in an AB paradigm. It was hypothesized that participants high in social anxiety
and in the rumination condition would show an attenuated AB when T2 was a threat

related word, compared to those high in social anxiety and in the distraction condition,
and participants low in social anxiety in both the distraction and rumination conditions.
Contrary to the hypothesis, participants who were high in social anxiety and in the
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Figure 15.

Lag by Word Interaction for the Correct Identification of T2 for Study 2
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rumination condition did not show an attenuated AB for threat related stimuli. In fact,
consistent with findings from Study 1, participants did not show any type of bias towards
threat related words. Thus, it appears as though rumination did not have any discernable
effect on the attentional bias. One potential reason for this could be because participants
were no longer ruminating about their negative speech feedback during the RSVP task.
Unfortunately, the degree that participants ruminated during the RSVP task was not
assessed; this is discussed further as a limitation of the current study. However, support
was found that the manipulation of rumination was successful, as participants in the
rumination condition reported significantly higher rumination levels compared to
participants in the distraction condition. Furthermore, participants high in social anxiety
in the rumination condition were found to ruminate significantly more compared to
participants low in social anxiety and in the rumination condition. Thus, the
manipulation was successful in that participants were ruminating; however it is unclear as

to the degree that rumination persisted during the RSVP task. Alternatively, it is possible
that an AB paradigm is not a useful cognitive paradigm that is conducive to assessing
attentional biases, particularly when pathological related terms (e.g., social threat words)
are placed in a T2 position as opposed to placement as Tl.
As in Study 1 , control words had a significantly higher accuracy identification

rate compared to threat related words. The replication of this finding for control words
suggests that the findings from Study 1 were not incidental. As previously theorized in
the discussion of Study 1 , there may be two potential reasons why control words had

higher accuracy identification rates compared to threat words. One reason for this finding
may be due to the priming of a neutral Tl - having a neutral Tl may prime participants
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for a neutral T2, which would result in higher identification rates when T2 is a control
word because it matches the semantic attentional set. An alternative explanation for the
finding of increased identification rates for control words stems from the hypothesis that
concrete objects require less attentional processing resources compared to abstract
concepts. However, no research to date has examined the possibility of abstract concepts

requiring additional processing resources compared to concrete objects.
Also consistent with findings from Study 1 were the effect of lag, with the highest
accuracy rates being found at lag 8, and the word by lag interaction. However, in contrast

with Study 1 , Study 2 found a significant interaction between social anxiety and word
type. There was a slight trend for participants low in social anxiety to have a higher
accuracy identification rate for control words compared to participants high in social
anxiety. What appears to be driving the social anxiety by word interaction is a modest
reduced accuracy for threat word compared to control word identification for low socially
anxious participants. This pattern was not observed in Study 1. One possible reason why
the word type by condition interaction was found in Study 2 and not Study 1 could be due
to the distress experienced by participants in Study 2 as a result from the speech task.
Participants low in social anxiety, and in the distraction condition experienced
significantly more distress prior to giving the speech, compared to participants low in
social anxiety and in the rumination condition. Interestingly enough, participants that
were low in social anxiety and in the distraction group also significantly reported
believing the speech feedback less compared to those low in social anxiety and in the
rumination condition. Given these results, it is possible that the amount of distress

experienced by those low in social anxiety in the distraction condition prior to giving
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their speech affected their view on whether or not to believe the speech feedback they
received. It is possible that denying the believability of the speech feedback serves as a
protective mechanism in terms of rationalizing the distress they felt prior to giving the

speech. Instead of attributing poor speech feedback to being nervous, it is possible that
the act of being nervous caused them to disregard any negative or threatening stimuli.
This notion would also provide a reason for the slightly hampered accuracy identification
rate for threat words in comparison to control words for low socially anxious participants
that is hypothesized to be driving the word by social anxiety condition interaction. It is

possible that participants who were in the distraction condition (as well as low in social
anxiety) engaged in a more avoidant bias towards social threat words, and are pulling

down the accuracy identification rate for the low social anxiety group as a collective.
One surprising finding was the significant differences that were found for distress
levels amongst the different groups prior to giving the impromptu speech. There are two

potential explanations for this occurrence: the failing of randomization, or experimenter
bias. The experimenter was aware of the social anxiety condition and manipulation
condition that each participant was in. There was a trend where participants high in social

anxiety rated the experimenter in slightly less favourable terms compared to participants
who were low in social anxiety. However, there was no difference found for
manipulation condition. Thus, if experimenter bias was the reason for the difference in
distress levels, then it would be expected that participants high in social anxiety and in
the rumination condition would have the least favourable impressions of the

experimenter, as this was the group that experienced the most distress prior to giving the
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impromptu speech. However, the ratings of the experimenter did not differ based on
manipulation condition.
One interesting finding was the social anxiety by manipulation condition
interaction on believability of speech feedback. Participants high in social anxiety were
more likely to believe the speech feedback given to them by the researcher compared to
participants low in social anxiety. Interesting to note is that participants high in social
anxiety did not differ in their believability ratings of the speech feedback based on
manipulation condition. However, for participants low in social anxiety, differences were
found in the degree they believed the speech feedback. Participants low in social anxiety
and in the rumination condition reported that they believed the speech feedback to be
accurate compared to participants low in social anxiety and in the distraction condition.
One reason for this could be that the rumination task that targeted participants to dwell on
counterfactual thoughts influenced how well they thought they actually did on the speech.
By having participants think about the problems with their speech (as opposed to
focusing on something else entirely) made them believe that the quality of their speech
was poor and consistent with the negative feedback provided to them by the

experimenter. This finding highlights the negative aspect that rumination can have on
shaping cognitions. Participants low in social anxiety were more likely to believe that
their speeches were below average when they ruminated and dwelled on these perceived

inadequacies. However, when participants low in social anxiety were not engaged in
ruminative behaviours, they were not as likely to believe the researcher's feedback. One
potential reason why this difference was not found for participants high in social anxiety
could be because regardless of whether they ruminated or not, participants high in social
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anxiety are sensitive towards social failure, and receiving negative feedback based on
their performance/interaction in a social situation.
Limitations

One of the limitations of this study was that the experimenter knew the social

anxiety level of the participant, as well as the manipulation condition that the participant
was placed in. Future research could avoid this limitation by having the experimenter
blind to the conditions of the participant through the use of another researcher to help
randomly assign participants to manipulation conditions. The only reason for knowing
the social anxiety level of the participant was to ensure equal random assignment into the
manipulation conditions. Although participants did not differ in their views of the
experimenter's behaviour in terms of their manipulation condition, participants'

judgments of the experimenter did differ in terms of their level of social anxiety.
However, it is impossible to know if the differences in judgment based on social anxiety
condition are a result of experimenter bias, or a result of participants high in social

anxiety feeling as though they are being judged more harshly regardless of the
experimenter's behaviours. Having the experimenter blind to conditions would help to
tease apart these findings.
A second limitation was that levels of rumination were not assessed during or
after the RSVP task. Given that it was hypothesized that rumination would have an

impact on the AB, it was a limitation that the current study did not assess if rumination
actually occurred during the RSVP task. Thus, it is impossible to ascertain if participants
ruminated about negative speech feedback while performing the RSVP task. It would be
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beneficial for future research to include a manipulation check assessing rumination levels
following a RSVP task.
A third limitation of the study was that random assignment in terms of distress did
not seem to work. Participants high in social anxiety in the rumination condition

experienced significantly more distress prior to the speech task compared to participants
high in social anxiety in the distraction condition. Participants low in social anxiety and
in the distraction condition experienced significantly more distress prior to the speech

task compared to participants low in social anxiety and in the rumination condition. It is
possible that the experimenter unconsciously treated the groups differently due to
experimenter bias. However, an alternative explanation is that random assignment did not
work.

One last limitation of the present study was that anxiety provoking levels of the
word stimuli was not assessed. Given that differences were found between the lags in

terms of anxiety provoking stimuli for threat words in Study 1 , it would have been useful
to assess if the new words that replaced words that were thrown out still had this effect.

However, Study 1 did not find that anxiety provoking ratings had any impact on the AB.
Still, it would have been interesting to assess if the new words added influenced the AB,
or if differences across the lags in terms of anxiety provoking ratings still remained.
In sum, Study 2 did not find support for the hypothesis that rumination leads to an

increased hypervigilance towards threat type stimuli in an AB paradigm for participants
high in social anxiety. One reason for this may be due to the manner in which the stimuli
were presented. As mentioned in Study 1, future research should examine rumination and
the attentional bias in an AB paradigm when a social threat or control word is placed as
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Tl . It is possible that any hypervigilance that may result from having a threat word as T2
is not able to be assessed due to processing demands of such abstract concepts compared
to concrete objects. Thus, future research could also seek to examine how neutral abstract

concepts fare as T2 compared to threat related words.
General Discussion

The main purpose for conducting the present studies was to examine the impact
that rumination has on attentional biases in social anxiety, with the hypothesis that
rumination would lead to an exaggerated hypervigilance towards threatening stimuli in
the environment for participants high in social anxiety. This hypothesis was derived from
the notion that the constant dwelling on negative information regarding the self would
make the individual hypervigilant towards external environmental cues related to their
perceived failure or inadequacy.
Overall, the main results and implications of the two studies can be summarized
as follows. No evidence emerged that would support the notion that preferential
processing occurs for socially anxious individuals in regards to threatening information,

as neither study found support for a hypervigilance towards social threat stimuli for
participants high in social anxiety. In fact, in contrast to previous research on emotional
words, threat words for both the low. and high socially anxious participants had

significantly lower accuracy identification rates compared to control words.
The fact that control words had a higher accuracy identification rate in both
studies suggests that a problem is occurring with the choice of control words. In one
study on social anxiety and the AB using facial stimuli, de Jong and Martens (2007)
found that when an angry face was placed as T2, it hampered the identification of a Tl
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happy face. Thus, in respect to the current studies, it is possible that T2 threat words were
receiving correct identification, but that the arousing nature of the words impaired the
identification rate of a Tl word. This would impact accuracy scores, because a trial in the
current studies was only scored as correct if a participant was able to correctly identify
both the Tl and T2 words. Although de Jong and Martens' study found support for the
interference of a threat T2 on the identification of Tl, the control block from Study 1

suggests that the impairment of Tl identification because of a T2 threat word may be
unlikely. In the control block for Study 1 participants were told to ignore Tl and only
identify T2 words; thus if threat words at T2 were receiving a higher accuracy
identification at the detriment of Tl identification, then an increased identification rate
for threat words should be apparent in the control block. However, consistent with the

pattern found in the experimental block in Study 1, as well as the results from Study 2,
control words had a significantly higher identification rate compared to threat words.

Thus, it seems unlikely that threat words were impairing the identification of Tl words
and subsequently causing a lower score for trials with threat words. As mentioned
previously, the most viable explanation for increased accuracy rates for control words

compared to threat words is surmised to result from categorical issues. As previously
mentioned, it is possible that abstract concepts take, more cognitive resources (e.g., time
and effort) to process and identify as opposed to concrete objects. It is also possible that
participants were more easily able to determine that the control words all came from a
common category - fruits and vegetables— as opposed to the threat words. Participants
may have been more likely to guess a T2 control word correctly simply because they had
realized that half of the time the green word was some type of fruit or vegetable.
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Therefore, when selecting control words, future research should make sure that the

category which the words come from is less transparent.
In attempts to further understand the nature of the attentional bias in social
anxiety, the second study examined the potential impact that rumination on negative
feedback had on the attentional bias. Contrary to the hypothesis that rumination would
exacerbate the hypervigilance towards threat stimuli for high socially anxious
participants, no effect was found. However, it is possible that participants in the
rumination condition were no longer ruminating during the RSVP task. Previous research
has found that when participants engage in an RSVP task and have their thoughts directed
elsewhere, the AB period is attenuated (Olivers &Nieuwenhuis, 2005). Although, it is
important to note that these findings were unable to be replicated in subsequent studies

(e.g., Olivers &Nieuwenhuis, 2006), other research has found that when cognitive load
increases, the AB becomes attenuated (e.g., Taatgen, Juvina, Schipper, Borst, & Martens,
2009). An attenuation of target identification when cognitive load increases may seem
counter-intuitive, however, it is thought that the diffusion of attention leaves an excess of
resources that would normally be allocated to Tl available for the processing and
consolidation of T2. Therefore, it could be argued that if participants in Study 2 in the
rumination condition were still dwelling on their negative feedback and feelings of

inadequacy during the RSVP condition, then an overall attenuation at lags 2 and 3 for
identification of T2 should have been found. If rumination were to be examined again

using an AB paradigm, then a measure of rumination should be used to assess the degree
that participants ruminated during the RSVP task.

110

Along with the examination of rumination in future studies, anticipatory
processing should also be examined. It is possible that the attentional bias differs for
when an individual engages in anticipatory versus post-event processing. Given that
rumination and anticipatory processing are hypothesized to play integral roles in the
maintenance and exacerbation of social anxiety, future research needs to further explore
how these variables are involved in the attentional bias.

Another limitation of the second study was that participants were only provided
with standardized negative feedback; future research could manipulate the feedback by

giving negative, positive, or neutral feedback. It would be interesting to examine if a
socially anxious person's attentional bias changes when provided with positive feedback,
given the fact that individuals high in social anxiety are extremely concerned with
meeting the expectations of others. Given that previous research has found that socially
anxious individuals also have a fear of positive evaluation (e.g., Weeks, Heimberg, &

Rodebaugh, 2008), future research should examine the impact that positive feedback,
compared to negative, and neutral feedback has on attentional biases.
Despite not finding support for any form of attentional bias for social anxiety in
either of the two studies, the current research does have some findings that are consistent

with previous research on rumination, as well as the AB. With respect to rumination,
Study 2 found that participants who were high in social anxiety and in the rumination
condition did ruminate more on their negative speech feedback in comparison to
participants high in social anxiety in the distraction condition, and participants low in
social anxiety in either condition. This finding is consistent with previous literature that
has found that in general, participants high in social anxiety ruminate more than
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participants low in social anxiety (e.g., Edwards et al., 2003). The fact that the high social
anxiety participants, in comparison to the low, in the rumination condition ruminated
more suggests that rumination is a behaviour/ thought pattern that the high anxiety
participants are used to engaging in when receiving negative feedback (either imagined or
actual). This is consistent with the cognitive models of social anxiety presented by Clark
and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) that stipulate the important role that
rumination plays in the maintenance of social anxiety. Overall, participants high in social
anxiety did not ruminate more than participants low in social anxiety, which was to be
expected given that half of the participants were in a distraction condition. Given that a
manipulation task was used to induce rumination or distraction among participants, one

may question the generalizability, or authenticity, of the rumination or distraction
experienced by participants high in social anxiety. Previous research conducted by
Kocovski et al. (2005) suggests that when ruminative and distractive coping were
assessed via self-report, participants high in social anxiety were more likely to report

engaging in ruminative thoughts and less likely to distract when faced with a social
stressor. Thus, although distraction may not be an activity that individuals high in social
anxiety are used to engaging in, and a manipulation design where distraction is induced
may have limited generalizability for those with high levels of social anxiety, it was still
important to assess if the attentional bias was affected in any way by this cognitive
process.

The AB is a robust phenomenon with hundreds of studies from the past two
decades finding support for decrease in accuracy identification for T2 at lags 2, 3 and 4
(Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Raymond et al., 1992; Weichselgartner & Sperling,
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1987). In terms of the AB, both of the present studies found support for the AB period,

with significant impairments in identification of T2 at lags 2 and 3 compared to lag 8.
However, the lack of attenuation for threat type words, regardless of social anxiety
condition, is inconsistent with previous AB literature (e.g., Anderson, 2005). It is

postulated that this disparity between the current studies and previous literature is a result
of the word stimuli that were used in both Study 1 and 2.

In general, future research needs to determine if the AB is a useful paradigm for
examining attentional biases for social anxiety. To date, only three studies have examined
social anxiety using the AB, with only one study finding differences between high and
low socially anxious participants. Arend and Botella (2002) found an attenuated AB
when Tl was a threat word for a high trait anxious group, compared to when Tl was a
neutral stimulus, and compared to participants low in trait anxiety. However, this study is

limited in ,that presenting threat stimuli as Tl does not allow for the examination of how
socially anxious individuals respond to word stimuli that precedes a threat. It is possible

that threatening stimuli presented at T2 interferes with the processing capability of Tl, as
de Jong and Martens (2007) observed. Although this notion is unlikely to be true for the
current studies, the problems with the control word stimuli may be preventing the
appearance of this effect.

/

The other two studies looking at the AB and social anxiety were done by de Jong

and colleagues (2007; 2009) where facial stimuli were used for the targets. Similar to the
current studies, in both of their studies, de Jong and colleagues did not find any

difference between high and low socially anxious participants on response to threat
stimuli. The fact that neither study conducted by de Jong and colleagues found support
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for an attentional bias for high socially anxious participants raises the question if the AB

is a useful paradigm for examining biases in social anxiety. It is possible that this
paradigm does not accurately tap into the mechanisms that are driving the attentional
bias. It is also possible that the nature of the attentional bias for threat in socially anxious
individuals cannot be adequately measured by any cognitive paradigm due to the nature,
complexity, and the multitude of factors that may contribute to the bias.
Overall, the research on attentional biases in social anxiety has been mixed, with
some research finding support for a hyperviguance towards threat (e.g., Mogg & Bradley,
2002), and other research finding support for avoidance (e.g., Mansell et al., 1999), and
other research suggesting a vigilance-avoidance of threat stimuli (e.g., Mogg et al., 2004).
Given the discrepancy in the literature that different cognitive paradigms cannot seem to
resolve, it is possible that factors such as self-focused attention mask the nature of the
attentional bias. Future research on attentional biases in relation to social anxiety should
further explore mechanisms that may contribute to the bias, and the circumstances under
which a bias may be found. It is possible that certain situations provoke a different type
of attentional bias. For example, the attentional bias that a socially anxious person

displays in a presentation situation may differ from the attentional bias held in a social
interaction. Consistent with this line of thought, previous research investigating
attentional biases in social anxiety has found support for this notion. For example,
Ononaive et al. (2002) found that when under a social threat condition (giving a speech),

high socially anxious participants showed a hypervigilance towards somatic (i.e., anxiety
symptom) words, compared to high socially anxious participants in the no-threat
condition who showed a hypervigilance for social evaluative words. These findings
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suggest that the type of situation dictates the type of stimuli that the socially anxious
individual will show an attentional bias towards.

Not only can the type of situation potentially dictate the nature of the attentional
bias, but also the specific anxiety an individual faces in terms of a social
situation/interaction. For example, Spector, Pecknold, and Libman (2003) found that

patients with generalized social phobia had a hypervigilance for social threat words
describing negative evaluation (e.g., criticize) and words denoting observable
characteristics of anxiety (e.g., blushing), compared to anxiety words not visible to others

(e.g., palpitations), and compared to non-anxious controls. This is also consistent with
previous research that has found that somatic symptom concerns differ between those
with social anxiety and those with other anxiety disorders. Those with social anxiety are
more concerned with symptoms that are visible and indicative of their anxiety to others,

such as blushing, twitching, sweating, and stammering (Amies, Gelder, & Shaw, 1983;
Solyom, Ledwidge, & Solyom, 1986).Thus, the current studies may benefit from a reanalysis of the data by dividing the social threat words into the following categories:
negative evaluation, observable characteristics of anxiety, and non-observable
characteristics of anxiety.

The type of emotional response that a situation evokes may also influence the
nature of the attentional bias. Mogg and Bradley (2004) suggest that fear and anxiety may

be characterized by two distinct motivational systems, and thus display different patterns
of cognitive bias. To support this theory, Mogg and Bradley found that trait anxiety was
associated with vigilance towards threat stimuli, but anxiety for specific fears (e.g., blood
injury fear) produced a vigilance-avoidance pattern.
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Overall, there are many directions that future research could examine with regards
to attentional biases in social anxiety, such as situational factors, mood, and the degree of
internal self-focus that may dictate the nature of the bias. The current research did not

find support for an attentional bias towards threat stimuli for socially anxious participants
using an AB paradigm. Rumination was also not found to have an impact on the
attentional bias in participants with high levels of social anxiety. Given that previous

research using cognitive paradigms to measure the attentional bias in social anxiety has
found mixed results, future research may want to explore the circumstances under which

hypervigilance versus avoidance asserts itself. Variables in the cognitive model of social
anxiety that are theorized to contribute to its maintenance should also be examined in
relation to the impact they may have on the attentional bias.
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Appendix A
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT

Attention and Social Anxiety
Katie Walters and Dr. Nancy Kocovski, Department of Psychology
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to further
investigate the cognitive mechanisms of social anxiety. Social anxiety is the type of anxiety
experienced in situations where one may be evaluated by others (e.g., presentations, parties). The
principal researcher is Katie Walters, a graduate student in the Department of Psychology, and
her research supervisor, Dr. Nancy Kocovski, Assistant Professor in the Department of
Psychology.
INFORMATION

Based on your scores from a brief questionnaire given to you over the phone you are eligible to
complete the following study. Your participation in this study will involve the completion of
questionnaires, followed by the completion of a computerized task. The questionnaires will be
used to assess social anxiety, and depression. You will then be asked to complete a "computerized
program viewing word stimuli. Afterwards you will be required to rate the effects of different
words. This study will take approximately 45 minutes to complete. It is expected that 40 students

will be participating in this research. The study cannot be fully explained at this time, but the full
details of the study will be explained following the conclusion of your participation in this
research.
RISKS

There are no physical risks associated with the computerized task. You may feel slight fatigue or
sore eyes from staring at a monitor, and thus are encouraged to take a break whenever you feel it
is necessary. Foreseeable psychological risks may include feelings of anxiety that may arise from
the surveys or the computerized task. You will be asked questions regarding depression and
suicidality, and are free at any time to omit your answer and/or withdraw from this study. If you

are experiencing any concerns about social anxiety, please contact Dr. Nancy Kocovski

(iikocovski(a),wlu.ca) and/or Counseling Services (519) 884-0710 extension 2338, 2nd floor,

Student Services Building, (http://www.mylaurier.ca/counselling; 22couns@wlu.ca) and/or
counseling services at Canadian Mental Health Association. Please note that Counseling Services
on campus are free and confidential.
BENEFITS

You will have the opportunity to take part in psychological research on social anxiety. In
addition, the information obtained from your participation may lead to a better understanding of
social anxiety.
CONFIDENTIALITY

All information that is obtained from you during the course of this research is completely
confidential and will not be shared with anyone other than the researcher (Katie Walters) and the

research supervisor (Dr. Nancy Kocovski). The consent form will be kept separately from the
data. All raw data (e.g. paper and pencil questionnaires) will be anonymous and only identified by
a research identification number in a locked file that can only be accessed by the researchers. All
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electronic information (e.g., answers to questions) will be anonymous and only identified by the
same research identification number in a password-protected computer file. Your name will not
appear in this file. There will be no identifying information on the data. If you complete the study,
raw data (paper and pencil questionnaires) will be retained for seven years and destroyed after
that time by Dr. Kocovski. The electronic data file will be retained indefinitely. If you choose to
withdraw from the study at any time your data will be destroyed. Although the results of this
study may be published, they will be reported in a way that makes it impossible to identify
individual participants. Only aggregate data will be presented. As such, your specific scores will
not be made available to you, though a general report of the study's findings will be made
available to you.
COMPENSATION

For participating in part one of this study you will receive $ 1 1 dollars.
CONTACT

If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, (or you experience adverse
effects as a result of participating in this study) you may contact the researcher, Katie Walters
fwalt3090@wlu.ca), at (519) 884-0710 ex. 2587, N2059 or the research supervisor, Dr. Nancy
Kocovski fakocovski(fl).wlu.ca) at (519) 884-0710 ex. 3519, office N2025. This project has been
reviewed and approved by the University Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University. If
you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or your rights as a
participant in research have been violated during the course of this project, you may contact Dr.
Bill Marr, Chair, University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University, at (519) 8840710, extension 2468, or by email at bmarr@wlu.ca.
PARTICIPATION

Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without penalty. If
you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and
without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you withdraw from the study
before data collection is completed your data will be deleted. You may withdraw from the study
at any time without penalty. You have the right to omit any question(s)/procedure(s) you choose.
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION

The results of this research may be presented at conferences or submitted for publication. The

results may also be written up for partial fulfillment of Katie Walter's Master of Arts degree.
CONSENT

I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to
participate in this study.
Participant's signature
Investigator's signature

.

Date
Date
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Appendix B
Mini- SPIN

For each question, please state the number that indicates the degree to which you feel the
statement is characteristic or true of you. The rating scale is as follows:
0 = Not at all
1 = A little bit

2 = Somewhat

3 = Very Much
4 = Extremely
1. Fear of embarrassment causes me to avoid doing things or speaking to people.
2. 1 avoid activities in which I am the center of attention.

3. Being embarrassing or looking stupid are among my worst fears.

Appendix C
Demographic Questionnaire

What is your gender?
What is your age?
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (check only one)
Completed part of high school
Graduated from high school
Completed some college or university

a
D
D

Graduated from university:
Undergraduate degree
Masters degree
Doctoral degree
Other professional degree (e.g., medical, law)
Graduated from college

D
D
D
a
D

What is your marital status?
Single

D

Married

D

Cohabiting

Separated

d

Divorced

d

Widow(er)

What is your occupational status?
Unemployed

o

Employed-full time

d

Employed-part time

Student- full time

o

Student-part time

d

Other

d

(please specify)
What is your ethnicity?
White/Caucasian d

Asian d

Native Canadian d
specify)

Hispanic p

Black/African-Canadian p

Other__

_(please
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Appendix D
Social Phobia Scale

For each of the questions, please check a number to indicate the degree to which you feel the
statement is characteristic or true of you. The rating scale is as follows:

Not at
all

1.

1 become anxious if I have to write in front

2.

of people.
I become self-conscious when using public
toilets.

3.
4.

I can suddenly become aware of my own
voice and of others listening to me.
I get nervous that people are staring at me
as I walk down the street.

5.

I fear I may blush when 1 am with others.

6.

I feel self-conscious if 1 have to enter a

7.
8.
9.

room where others are already seated.
I worry about shaking or trembling when
I'm watched by other people.
I would get tense if I had to sit facing other
people on a bus or train.
I get panicky that others might see me faint
or be sick or ill.

10. I would find it difficult to drink something
in a group of people.
1 1 . It would make me feel self-conscious to

eat in front of a stranger in a restaurant.
12. It am worried people will think my
behaviour odd.

13. I would get tense if 1 had to carry a tray
across a crowded cafeteria.

14. I worry I'll lose control of myself in front
of other people.
15. 1 worry I might do something to attract the
attention of other people.
16. When in an elevator, I am tense if people
look at me.

17. 1 can feel conspicuous standing in a line.
18. I can get tense when I speak in front of
other people
1 9. I worry my head will shake or nod in front
of others.

20. I feel awkward and tense if I know people
are watching me.

Slightly

Moderately

Very

Extremely

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

4

0

3

0

3

Appendix E
Social Interaction and Anxiety Scale
For each question, please check a number to indicate the degree to which you feel the statement is
characteristic or true of you. The rating scale is as follows:

Not at
all

Slightly

Moderately

Very

Extremely

1.

I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in
authority (teacher, boss).

0

2

3

4

2.

I have difficulty making eye contact with others.

0

2

3

4

0

2

3

4

0

2

3

4

3.

I become tense if I have to talk about myself or
my feelings.
4. I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the
people T work with.
5.

I find it easy to make friends my own age.

0

2

3

4

6.

1 tense up if I meet an acquaintance on the street.

0

2

3

4

7.

When mixing socially, 1 am uncomfortable.

0

2

3

4

8.

1 feel tense if I am alone with just one person.

0

2

3

4

9.

I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc.

0

2

3

4

10. I have difficulty talking with other people.

0

2

3

4

11. I find it easy to think of things to talk about.

0

2

3

4

12. I worry about expressing myself in case I appear

0

2

3

4

0

2

3

4

14. 1 have difficulty talking to attractive people of
the opposite sex.

0

2

3

4

15. I find myself worrying that I won't know what
to say in social situations.

0

2

3

4

0

2

3

4

0

2

3

4

0

2

3

4

19. 1 am tense mixing in a group.

0

2

3

4

20. I am unsure whether to greet someone I know
only slightly.

0

2

3

4

awkward.

13. I find it difficult to disagree with another's point
of view.

16. I am nervous mixing with people I don't know
well.

17. I feel I'll say something embarrassing when
talking.

1 8. When mixing in a group, 1 find myself worrying
I will be ignored.
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Appendix F
Beck Depression Inventory-II

Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each
group of statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that
best describes the way you have been feeling during the past week, including today.
Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the
group seem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that
you do not choose more than one statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in
Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite).
1. Sadness

0
1
2

I do not feel sad.
I feel sad much of the time.
I am sad all the time.

3

I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand

6. Punishment Feelings
0 I don't feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.

it.
7.
2. Pessimism

0 I am not discouraged about my future.
1 I feel more discouraged about my future
than I used to be.

2 I do not expect things to work out for me.
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only
get worse

Self-Dislike

0
1
2
3
8.

I feel the same about myself as ever.
I have lost confidence in myself.
I am disappointed in myself.
I dislike myself.
Self-Criticalness

0 I don't criticize or blame myself more than
usual.

3. Past Failure
0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I have failed more than I should have.

2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures.
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person.
4. Loss of Pleasure

0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from
the things I enjoy.
1 I don't enjoy things as much as I used to.
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I
used to enjoy.
3 I can't get any pleasure from the things I
used to enjoy.
5. Guilty Feelings
0 I don't feel particularly guilty.

1

I feel guilty over many things I have done
or should have done.

2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.

3 I feel guilty all of the time

1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be.
2 I criticize myself for all of my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that
happens.
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes
0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I
would not carry them out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10.
0
1
2
3

Crying
I don't cry anymore than I used to.
I cry more than I used to.
I cry over every little thing.
I feel like crying, but I can't.
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3a I sleep most of the day.
0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get back to
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual.
sleep
2 I am so restless or agitated that it's hard to
stay still.
17. Irritability
0 I am no more irritable than usual.
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to
1 I am more irritable than usual.
keep moving or doing something.

11. Agitation

12. Loss of Interest

2
3

I am much more irritable than usual.
I am irritable all the time.

0 I have not lost interest in other people or
activities.

1

I am less interested in other people or things
than before.

2 I have lost most of my interest in other people
or things.
3 It's hard to get interested in anything.
13. Indecisiveness
0 I make decisions about as well as ever.
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions
than usual.

2 I have much greater difficulty in making
decisions than I used to.

3 I have trouble making any decisions.
14. Worthlessness
0 I do not feel I am worthless.

1

I don't consider myself as worthwhile and
useful as I used to.

2 I feel more worthless as compared to other
people.
3 I feel utterly worthless.

15. Loss of Energy
0
1
2
3

I have as much energy as ever.
I have less energy than I used to have.
I don't have enough energy to do very much.
I don't have enough energy to do anything.

16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern
0 I have not experienced any change in my
sleeping pattern.

Ia I sleep somewhat more than usual.
Ib I sleep somewhat less than usual.

2a I sleep a lot more than usual.

2b I sleep a lot less than usual.

18. Changes in Appetite
0 I have not experienced an change in my
appetite.
Ia My appetite is somewhat less than usual.
Ib My appetite is somewhat greater than
usual.

2a My appetite is much less than before.
2b My appetite is much greater than usual.
3a I have no appetite at all.
3b I crave food all the time.

19. Concentration Difficulty
0
1

I can concentrate as well as ever.
I can't concentrate as well as usual.

2 It's hard to keep my mind on anything for
very long.
3 I find I can't concentrate on anything.
20. Tiredness or Fatigue
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily
than usual.

2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the
things I used to do.
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the
things I used to do.
21. Loss of Interest in Sex

0 I have not noticed any recent change in
my interest in sex.
1
2

I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
I am much less interested in sex now.

3 I have lost interest in sex completely.
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Appendix G
Word Ratings

Please rate the following words on how anxiety provoking you find them to be. For each
item, please answer using the following scale:
1

_

2

3

Not at All

4—

5

6

Moderately
Anxiety
Provoking

Provoking

Extremely
Anxiety
Provoking

Advertise

Failure

Pea

Repulsive

Anxious

Fig

Apple

Florist

Peaches
Pear

Insecure
Disliked

Ashamed

Pepper
Pineapple

Unworthy

Awkward

Foolish
Fox

Bargain

Fragrance

Pot

Outcast

Beans

Fruit

Pumpkin

Blackberry
Boring
Cabbage

Garment
Golf
Grandfather

Radishes
Raisins

Despise
Lonely

Carrots
Cauliflower

Grapes

Rejected
Remedy

Humiliated

Seize

Incompetent
Inept

Shaky

Idiot
Unloved

Shelter

Disgust

Infer
Inferior

Shovel

Ridicule

Clumsy
Inadequate

Leather

Shy
Spinach
Stammering
Strawberry
Stupid

Lemon

Stutter

Lettuce
Lime
Loser

Tense

Dealer
Decorate

Disgraced

Lottery

Towel

Dresser

Melon

Translator

Dressmaker
Dull

Mortified
Mushrooms

Umbrella

Dumb

Nervous

Eagle

Odd

Uneasy
Uptight
Vegetables

Economical
Embarrassed

Orange
Parsley

Weak
Weird

Celery
Chin
Cloud
Coconut

Collect
Consolidate
Cora
Cranberries
Criticized
Curb

Jittery
Judged
Laundry

Thread
Tomatoes

Worthless

Hurtful
Shunned

Ugly

Unsuccessful
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Appendix H
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY
DEBRIEFINGFORM

Attention and Social Anxiety

Katie Walters and Dr. Nancy Kocovski, Department of Psychology
It is very important that you read this information. Please take some time to go over it carefully.
The overall goal of this research is to examine the attentional biases in those with high
and low levels of social anxiety. You were selected to participate in this study based on your

results to a brief questionnaire given over the phone. Participants that scored in the bottom and
top third on a social anxiety measure were invited to partake in this study. Social anxiety is the
type of anxiety that is experienced in situations where one may be evaluated or judged by others
(see p. 582 of your psychology text book for more information on anxiety).

Cognitive models of anxiety disorders suggest the existence of an attentional processing bias to
information related to anxiety. It is hypothesized that such preferential processing serves to
exacerbate and maintain the disorder. However, there appears to be a discrepancy in the literature
as to the nature of the bias. For example, some research has shown that anxious individuals show
a hypervigilance bias to threatening material in their environment while other research has found
that anxious individuals avoid threatening material.
The attentional blink (AB) paradigm is designed to target attentional processes across time
through the use of stimuli presented in rapid succession at the same fixation point. This type of
presentation of stimuli is called a rapid series visual presentation (RSVP) stream. When stimuli
are presented in a RSVP stream it is hard to process a second target within 500 ms of the
presentation of the first target. This phenomenon is known as the AB. Previous research has
extensively documented that when the second target is of relevance to the individual, their AB
will be attenuated.

The computerized experiment that you took part in was an RSVP stream looking for an

AB. We have hypothesized that the participants high in social anxiety will have an attenuated AB
to social threat words compared to neutral words, or other participants low in social anxiety. For
instance, it is hypothesized that if you have a high social anxiety score you would have a higher
accuracy identifying threat related words (such as loser) compared to those with a low social

anxiety score. Furthermore, it is also hypothesized that those with a high social anxiety score will
identify more threat related words compared to neutral fruit related words, such as melon. It is
hoped that the findings of this research will help to clarify the discrepancy in the literature
surrounding the nature of attentional biases in social anxiety.
Thank you for your participation in this study.

If you have any questions about your participation in this study or about the study itself, please
contact:

Katie Walters

Dr. Nancy Kocovski
Department of Psychology
Wilfrid Laurier University

Department of Psychology
Wilfrid Laurier University
or

Office: N2059
Phone: 519-884-0710 ext. 2587

Office: N2025
Phone: 519-884-0710 ext. 3519

Email: walt3090@wlu.ca

Email: nkocovski@wlu.ca

If you feel your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this
project, you may contact Dr. Bill Marr, Chair, University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier
University, at (519) 884-0710, ext. 2468, bmarr@wlu.ca.
Counselling services at WLU are confidential and free of charge. If you are experiencing social
anxiety, depression, or suicidal ideation, please refer to the following list of resources:
Counseling Services
Wilfrid Laurier University
75 University Avenue West
Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3C5
(519)884 0710x2338
http://www.mylaurier.ca/counselling/home.htm

Canadian Mental Health Association
Kitchener Branch

67 King Street East
Kitchener, ON N2G 2K4
Ph: (519) 744-7645
http://www.cmha.ca
http://www.cmhawrb.on.ca

Appendix I
WILFRIDLAURIERUNIVERSITY
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT
Attention and Rumination

Katie Walters and Dr. Nancy Kocovski, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to further
investigate the cognitive mechanisms of social anxiety. Social anxiety is the type of anxiety
experienced in situations where one may be evaluated by others (e.g., presentations, parties). The
principal researcher is Katie Walters, a graduate student in the Department of Psychology, and
her research supervisor, Dr. Nancy Kocovski, Assistant Professor in the Department of
Psychology.
INFORMATION

Based on your scores from a previous measure in mass testing you are eligible to complete the
following study. Your participation in this study will involve the completion of questionnaires,
followed by giving a 5 minute speech, and then completing of a computerized task. The

questionnaires will be used to assess social anxiety and depression. You will then be asked to

complete a computerized program viewing word stimuli. This study will take approximately 45
minutes to complete. It is expected that 80 students will be participating in this research. The
study cannot be fully explained at this time, but the full details of the study will be explained
following the conclusion of your participation in this research.
RISKS

There are no physical risks associated with the computerized task. You may feel slight fatigue or

sore eyes from staring at a monitor, and thus are encouraged to take a break whenever you feel it

is necessary. Foreseeable psychological risks may include feelings of anxiety that may arise from
the surveys, giving the speech, or the computerized task. You are free at any time to omit your
answer and/or withdraw from this study. If you are experiencing any concerns about social

anxiety, please contact Dr. Nancy Kocovski (nkocovski@wlu.ca) and/or Counseling Services

(519) 884-0710 extension 2338, 2nd floor, Student Services Building,

(http://www.mylaurier.ca/counselling; 22couns@w1u.ca) and/or counseling services at Canadian
Mental Health Association. Please note that Counseling Services on campus are free and
confidential.
BENEFITS

You will have the opportunity to take part in psychological research on social anxiety. In
addition, the information obtained from your participation may lead to a better understanding of
social anxiety.
CONFIDENTIALITY

All information that is obtained from you during the course of this research is completely
confidential and will not be shared with anyone other than the researcher (Katie Walters) and the
research supervisor (Dr. Nancy Kocovski), and the Psychology Research Experience Pool
Teaching Assistant (Glen Gorman). Student IDs will be used to match the mass testing data to
today's data, and then student IDs will be deleted. Identifying information (e.g., student numbers)
will not be linked to the data after compensation has been given. The consent form will be kept

separately from the data. All raw data (e.g. paper and pencil questionnaires) will be anonymous.

Consent forms and all of the raw data will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in Dr. Kocovski' s

lab. All electronic information (e.g., answers to questions) will be anonymous and only identified
by the same research identification number in a password-protected computer file. Your name
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will not appear in this file. There will be no identifying information on the data. If you complete
the study, raw data (paper and pencil questionnaires) will be retained for seven years and
destroyed after that time by Dr. Kocovski on April 30, 2017. Dr. Kocovski will also destroy
consent forms on April 30, 2017. The electronic data file will be retained indefinitely. If you
choose to withdraw from the study at any time your data will be destroyed. Although the results

of this study may be published, they will be reported in a way that makes it impossible to identify

individual participants. Only aggregate data will be presented. As such, your specific scores will
not be made available to you, though a general report of the study's findings will be made
available to you.
COMPENSATION

For participating in this study you will receive 1 credit. Other ways to earn the same amount of
credit are to complete ajournai article review or other research studies (guidelines are available in

the general psychology office, N2006).
CONTACT

If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, (or you experience adverse
effects as a result of participating in this study) you may contact the researcher, Katie Walters
(walt3090(£;wlu.ca), at (519) 884-0710 ex. 2587, N2059 or the research supervisor, Dr. Nancy
Kocovski inkoeovski(a).wlu.ca) at (519) 884-0710 ex. 3519, office N2025. This project has been

reviewed and approved by the University Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University. If
you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or your rights as a
participant in research have been violated during the course of this project, you may contact Dr.
Robert Basso, Wilfrid Laurier University Research Ethics Chair, at (519) 884-0710, ext. 5225, or
by email at rbasso@wlu.ca.
PARTICIPATION

Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without penalty. If
you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and
without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you withdraw from the study
before data collection is completed your data will be deleted. However, please note that it would

be impossible to remove your data from the study after it is collected, as the data is not linked to
participants. You may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. You have the right to
omit any question(s)/procedure(s) you choose.
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION

The results of this research may be presented at conferences or submitted for publication. The
results may also be written up for partial fulfillment of Katie Walters' Master of Arts degree.
You will be sent information about the final results via email by April 1, 2010 and the results will

be posted outside the psychology department main office.
CONSENT

I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to
participate in this study.

Participant's signature

Date

Investigator's signature

Date

140

Appendix J
PREP Sign Up Sheet
Title: Attention and Rumination
Researcher: Katie Walters

Supervisor: Dr. Nancy Kocovski
Credit: 1 credit

Description of Study: The purpose of this study is to investigate attentional biases and
rumination in social anxiety. Visibility of this study is based on mass testing results. This
study will take approximately 45 minutes and takes place in the lab. You will be asked to
complete questionnaires (e.g., on demographics, anxiety), give a speech, and then
perform a task viewing stimuli on a computer. Approximately 80 participants will take
part in this study.

Appendix K
Speech Feedback

Your performance on the speech task has been rated based on how your performance
compares to other's speeches. You have been rated using the criteria below. Please take
some time to thoroughly go over your feedback.
Below

Average
Eye Contact
¦

Maintains

appropriate
eye
contact level of

Content of Argument
¦ Ideas clearly
presented

¦ Interesting

Body Language
¦ Slouching
¦ Stiff posture
¦

Movement

Articulation
¦

Use of filler words

¦
¦
¦
¦

(urn, like)
Stuttering
Long pauses
Appropriate volume
Appropriate speed

Appearance
¦ Blushing
¦ Sweating
¦

Uncomfortable

Overall Evaluation

<N/ ^>

Average

Above

Average

Appendix L
Distraction Condition Visualizations
Instructions:

For the next 10 minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the ideas on the

following pages. Read each item slowly and silently to yourself. As you read the items, use your
imagination and concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas. Spend a few moments
visualizing and concentrating on each item.
Please continue until the experimenter tells you the time is finished.
Think about: and imagine a boat slowly crossing the Atlantic
Think about: the layout of a typical classroom
Think about: the shape of a large black umbrella
Think about: the movement of an electric fan on a warm day
Think about: raindrops sliding down a windowpane
Think about: a double-decker bus driving down a street
Think about: and picture a full moon on a clear night
Think about: clouds forming in the sky
Think about: the layout of the local shopping center

Think about: and imagine a plane flying overhead
Think about: fire darting around a log in a fire-place
Think about: and concentrate on the expression on the face of the Mona Lisa
Think about: a parking lot at a drive-in

Think about: two birds sitting on a tree branch
Think about: the shadow of a stop sign

Think about: the layout of the local post office
Think about: the structure of a high-rise office building
Think about: and picture the Eiffel Tower

Think about: and imagine a truckload of watermelons

Think about: the pattern on an Oriental rug
Think about: the "man in the moon"

Think about: the shape of the continent of Africa
Think about: a band playing outside
Think about: a group of polar bears fishing in a stream

r

Think about: the shape of the torch on the Statue of Liberty
Think about: the shape of the state of California
Think about: the way the Grand Canyon looks at sunset
Think about: the structure of the Golden Gate Bridge
Think about: a train stopped at a station
Think about: a lone cactus in the desert

Think about: the shape of the country of Italy
Think about: a row of shampoo bottles on display

Think about: a gas station on the side of a highway
Think about: the fuzz on the shell of a coconut
Think about: the Presidents' faces on Mount Rushmore

Think about: a band playing "The Star Spangled Banner"
Think about: the shape of a cello
Think about: the birthmark on Gorbachev's head

Think about: the shape of the United States
Think about: the baggage claim area at the airport
Think about: the size of the Statue of Liberty
Think about: the shape of a baseball glove
Think about: a freshly painted door
Think about: the shiny surface of a trumpet

Appendix M
Rumination Condition Questionnaire

For the 10 minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the ideas on the following

pages. Read each item slowly and silently to yourself. As you read the items, use your
imagination and concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas. Spend a few moments
visualizing and concentrating on each item, and then write down your thoughts in the space
provided below.
Think about: the concerns you had prior to giving your speech. Write about these thoughts.

Think about: the concerns you had during your speech. Write about these thoughts.

Think about: the concerns you had after giving your speech. Write about these thoughts.

Think about: your speech feedback. Write about these thoughts.

Think about: how you appeared while giving the speech. Write about these thoughts.
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Think about: the physical sensations you experienced while giving your speech. Write about these
thoughts.

Think about: all the mistakes you made during your speech. Write about these thoughts.

Think about: how you did on your speech compared to others. Write about these thoughts.

Think about: how you could have improved your articulation while giving the speech. Write
about these thoughts.

Think about: how you could have improved the content of your argument during your speech.
Write about these thoughts.
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Appendix N
Rumination Questionnaire (RQ)

Please consider how much you have thought about the speech task you participated in
during this study and answer the following questions. Please circle the number that most
accurately reflects your experience.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

To what extent did you think about the
speech task since you gave it?
How negative were your thoughts about the
speech task?
How positive were your thoughts about the
speech task?
To what extent did you criticize yourself
about not handling the speech task well?
How much did you think about other past
instances of speaking in public?
To what extent did you think about the
anxiety you experienced during the speech
task?

m

¦l"

Never
True

Rarely

0

1

1

Sometimes
2

Often
3

3

1 3. G
3

Very
Often
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Appendix O
Believability Measure

For the following questions, please rate the degree to which you disagreed or agreed with
the research assistant's assessment of your speech for each of the separate categories that
you were rated on.

Strongly
Disagree

Neither

Disagree

1

i.)

Eye Contact

2.)

Content of Argument

3.)

Body Language

4.)

Articulation

5.)

Appearance

6.)

Overall Performance Score

Disagree or
Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Appendix P
SUDS Ratings
25

50

75

100
No distress

Highest

Mild Distress
Moderate distress
Slight discomfort
Some interference

Significant distress

Possible
Distress

DISTRESS

(0-100)
a) How distressed/anxious were you before the speaking task?
b) How distressed/anxious were you during the speaking task?
b) How distressed/anxious were you after the speaking task?
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Appendix Q
End of Study Questionnaire

1. Please rate the following questions on this scale:
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Don't Know

Agree

Strongly Agree

1

a)

The researcher in the study was friendly towards me.

b)

I did not feel judged by the researcher.

c)

The researcher made me feel uncomfortable.

d)

The researcher smiled a lot during my speech.

e)

The researcher gave me the impression he/she did not like me.

f)

I thought the researcher was cold and unfriendly.

2. Do you have any other comments about this study?
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Appendix R
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY
DEBRIEFING FORM

Attention and Social Anxiety
Katie Walters and Dr. Nancy Kocovski, Department of Psychology
It is very important that you read this information. Please take some time to go over it carefully.
The overall goal of this research is to examine the effect that rumination has on
attentional biases in those with high and low levels of social anxiety. You were selected to
participate in this study based on your mass testing results. Participants that scored in the bottom
and top third on a social anxiety measure were invited to partake in this study. Social anxiety is

the type of anxiety that is experienced in situations where one may be evaluated or judged by
others (see p. 582 of your introductory psychology text book for more information on anxiety).
Cognitive models of anxiety disorders suggest the existence of an attentional processing
bias to information related to anxiety. However, there appears to be a discrepancy in the literature
as to the nature of the bias. For example, some research has shown that anxious individuals show
a hypervigilance bias to threatening material in their environment, while other research has found
that anxious individuals avoid threatening material. Cognitive models of social anxiety also
highlight the importance of rumination in maintaining and exacerbating anxiety.
The feedback from the speech that you gave was false, and was designed to elicit high
levels of rumination of those with high levels of social anxiety. After receiving and reviewing
your speech feedback, you were randomly assigned to either a distraction or rumination
condition. Participants in the distraction condition were asked to visualize a list of items that are
externally focused away from the self and any anxiety symptoms. An example of an object would
be: "Think about: raindrops sliding down a window pane". If you were in the rumination
condition, you were asked to think about your speech feedback and write about how you could
have improved your speech to do better on each of the sections you were "evaluated" on.
Deception was necessary for this study in order to provide something for the rumination group to
dwell on. Concealment of your mass testing results was also necessary in order for you, the
participant, to remain blind to which category you fell in to (e.g., either high social anxiety, or
low social anxiety). This was important because, knowing what group you fell in to may have
influenced your response to questionnaire items, the speech, or the computerized task.
The attentional blink (AB) paradigm is designed to target attentional processes across time
through the use of stimuli presented in rapid succession at the same fixation point. This type of
presentation of stimuli is called a rapid series visual presentation (RSVP) stream. When stimuli
are presented in a RSVP stream it is hard to process a second target within 500 ms of the

presentation of the first target. This phenomenon is known as the AB. Previous research has
extensively documented that when the second target is of relevance to the individual, their AB
will be attenuated.

The computerized experiment that you took part in was an RSVP stream looking for an
AB. We have hypothesized that the participants high in social anxiety and in the rumination
condition will have an attenuated AB to social threat words compared to neutral words,

participants high in social anxiety in the distraction condition, and participants who are low in

151

social anxiety in both the distraction and rumination conditions. For instance, it is hypothesized
that if you have a high social anxiety score, and are in the rumination condition, you would have a
higher accuracy identifying threat related words (such as loser) compared to those with high
social anxiety in the distraction condition, and those with low social anxiety scores. We are
hypothesizing that this will occur because the social threat words will be highly salient to those
with social anxiety, particularly if participants just spent the past 10 minutes thinking about how
their speech performance could have been improved. It is hoped that the findings of this research
will help to clarify the discrepancy in the literature surrounding the nature of attentional biases in
social anxiety.
Researchers have discovered that when participants are given erroneous feedback and
given a debriefing form stating the feedback was predetermined, they still evaluated their
performance and abilities as negative. Thus, it is important that you realize there is the
possibility that negative beliefs about the self due to the erroneous feedback can still exist

despite knowing that the feedback was false. If you have any negative self perceptions, please
contact counseling services, whose information is provided on the back of this form.

Thank you for your participation in this study. Results will be e-mailed to you by April 1,
2010 and posted outside the psychology main office.
If you have any questions about your participation in this study or about the study itself, please
contact:

Katie Walters
Department of Psychology
Wilfrid Laurier University

Dr. Nancy Kocovski
Department of Psychology
Wilfrid Laurier University
or

Office: N2059
Phone: 519-884-0710 ext. 2587

Office: N2025
Phone: 519-884-0710 ext. 3519

Email: walt3090@wlu.ca

Email: nkocovski@wlu.ca

If you feel your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this
project, you may contact Dr. Robert Basso, Wilfrid Laurier University Research Ethics Chair, at
(519) 884-0710, ext. 5225, or by email at rbasso@wlu.ca.
Counselling services at WLU are confidential and free of charge. If you are experiencing social
anxiety, depression, or suicidal ideation, please refer to the following list of resources:
Counseling Services Canadian Mental Health Association
Wilfrid Laurier University Kitchener Branch
75 University Avenue West 67 King Street East
Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3C5 Kitchener, ON N2G 2K4
(519) 884 0710 x2338 Ph: (519) 744-7645
http://www.cmha.ca

http://www.mylaurier.ca/counselling/home.htm http://www.cmhawrb.on.ca

